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ABSTRACT 
Strategy work is principally about resource alteration. As managers attempt to alter their organ-
izational resources, they need to ask two questions: “What are our resources?” and “How can 
we use these resources?” Managers will probably have little difficulty answering these ques-
tions in the case of tangible resources, e.g., tools, money, and facilities. However, in the case 
of intangible resources e.g., intellectual property, brands, and goodwill, these questions become 
more difficult to answer. And in the case of abstract resources, e.g., attention, creativity, and 
culture, the answers become even more elusive. 
The mainstream advice to managers is that they should accurately assess their organizational 
resource base and unambiguously understand how these resources link to performance before 
they attempt to alter resources. This dissertation investigates how resource assessments actually 
take place in practice, how resource understandings shape resource alteration choices, and how 
resource alteration, in turn, shapes how managers understand their organizational resources. 
Three fine-grained studies highlight the contentious aspects of resource alteration. The studies 
show how managers try to find advantageous uses of resources they do not yet possess in order 
to solve problems that they often do not fully understand. The studies show also how managers, 
depending on their hierarchical and functional area memberships, come up with different an-
swers to what resources they have and how these resources can be used. Not more or less accu-
rate, just different. 
A theoretical model is proposed that depicts resource alteration as a perpetual cycle. By 
combining cognitive theory and practice theory, the model attempts to capture how activity 
configurations shape both practical and conceptual resource understandings and how these re-
source understandings predispose actors to certain resource alteration choices. The model also 
proposes that the resulting feedback on these resource alteration proposals, in turn, alter activity 
configurations. On the basis of the dissertation’s findings and the theoretical model, managers 
are advised to consider three dimensions of resources—asset characteristics, coordinated activ-
ities, and enacted rules—when they attempt to answer resource related questions. 
 
  
Keywords: Resource, resource understanding, resource alteration, cognitive theory, practice 
theory, fine-grained, micro-level. 
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1. Introduction 
Resources are essential to all economic activity. Firms convert resources such as raw materials 
and know-how into products like laptops, frozen food, and TV broadcasts. These products are 
then distributed to people using additional resources such as firm brands, logistics, and payment 
processors to facilitate exchanges and transfers. Other resources are then involved in the final 
use of products and services. For instance, electricity is used to power your laptop. 
There is no doubt that resources are central to a firm’s immediate and future performance. 
Despite this importance, it is surprisingly difficult to answer what a resource actually is. Wer-
nerfelt (1995: 172) succinctly captures growing concerns around what constitutes a resource 
when he refers to resources as “an amorphous heap.” His description is telling, considering that 
what one firm views as a resource another may not, that the way one firm views a resource is 
often different from how another firm views that resource, and that individuals within firms 
often disagree on what a resource actually is and what it should be used for. Despite a growing 
interest, we still know little about what resources are (Lockett, O’Shea, & Wright, 2008) and 
even less about how resources are altered (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Regnér, 2008, 2015). What-
ever a resource is, firms are keen to have better resources than their competitors, and scholars 
are zealous in their study of how resources and resource alterations are linked to performance. 
1.1. Problem discussion 
Two of today’s most dominant resource focused strategic management theories—the resource 
based view (RBV) and the dynamic capabilities (DC) perspective—have predominantly ex-
plored resources with a coarse-grained focus. While this coarse-grained focus has resulted in a 
knowledge corpus around what constitutes a sought after resource and what managers should 
do given the resources at their disposal, it offers little insight into what managers actually do 
with these resources (Barney & Arikan, 2001). 
In hindsight, it is evident that Kodak should have pursued the digital imaging revolution it 
ignited and that Nokia should have used their organizational resources to develop a different 
product portfolio. But knowing what managers should do with resources is not necessarily help-
ful in explaining what they actually do with resources. Micro-level studies show that what man-
agers actually do with resources depends on these managers’ intra-organizational task environ-
ments (Regnér, 2003); resources and their uses are context dependent.  
A growing body of micro-level studies highlights the importance of making explicit what 
constitutes a resource, how actors understand resources and their uses, and how resource alter-
ation unfolds. These studies draw on multiple streams of literature to inform their findings. In 
doing so, however, the different streams of literature have produced contrasting answers. 
For instance, Danneels’ (2011) investigation of Smith Corona shows that managers’ mental 
representations of resources (i.e., how they understand the properties of their resources and the 
potential uses of these resources) determine how they attempt to alter the way these resources 
are used. His investigation shows also that a firm’s survival may depend on its managers un-
derstanding their firm’s resources in ways that are similar to how their customers and other 
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industry actors outside the firm understand these same resources. Relatedly, Tripsas and Gavetti 
(2000) show us that firms may fail when the resource understandings differ within a firm. These 
studies link resource alteration outcomes to resource understandings that differ either between 
a firm and its external environment or within a firm between its task environments. 
In contrast, Dougherty (1992a) shows that the activities that are unique to a certain functional 
area—e.g., procedures, routines, and methods of working—determine what members of that 
functional area can understand. She uses these differences in activities to explain why issues 
related to divergent understandings exist. We know that these various procedures, routines, and 
methods of working continuously evolve as actors work together toward common goals (Bar-
ley, 1986; Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Feldman, 2012). Relatedly, Feldman (2004) argues that a firm’s 
resources enable activity that in turn generates new resources. While these authors agree that 
resource understandings are inextricably linked to ongoing activity, they generally oppose the 
idea that shared resource understandings determine resource alteration, and some even question 
whether resource understandings exist as mental representations at all. 
Scholars also disagree on how divergences in resource activities and/or resource understand-
ings affect performance. Some link divergences to failures and barriers (e.g., Danneels, 2011; 
Dougherty, 1992a). Others do not. Floyd and Lane (2000: 166) explain that “managers in func-
tional areas will tend to interpret environmental cues through their professional or occupational 
lenses and reach different conclusions as to appropriate roles and actions.” From this view of 
resource activity, divergences are a source of variation that firms can use to successfully renew 
themselves as environments change (Burgelman, 1991). Here, it is not the divergence itself that 
is problematic but a lack of ability to coordinate various task environments. But, even success-
ful firms, for instance 3M, have experienced well-coordinated failures (Garud & Rappa, 1994). 
While a complement to existing coarse-grained studies, micro-level investigations show that 
the link between resources and their uses is poorly understood. There is an agreement around 
the view of organizations as consisting of multiple environments where actors perceive re-
sources and their uses differently. However, the literature contains inconsistencies as to how 
these divergences matter and for what they matter. Also, the micro-level literature disagrees on 
what a resource is, what resource understanding involves, and how resources can be altered, if 
at all. These inconsistencies are problematic if we are to bridge the gap between what we know 
managers should do with resources during times of change and what we know about what they 
actually do as they alter resources. Here, Wilson and Jarzabkowski (2004: 15) advise research-
ers to “investigate strategy through the microscope” and to examine resource related activity 
with a fine-grained focus.1 
                                               
1 A fine-grained study is not to be confused with a micro-foundations study. While both focus on the micro-level, 
a fine-grained study investigates what actually takes place as actors understand and alter resources. In contrast, a 
micro-foundations study investigates how micro-level mechanisms enable macro-level outcomes (cf Foss & Felin, 
2005, 2009). 
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1.2. Research objective 
To date there are limited fine-grained accounts of how resource alterations unfold within firms 
(Regnér, 2008, 2015). We know that an organization is made out of different, but interlinked, 
task environments (Daft & Weick, 1984; Ocasio, 1997). We know also that these task environ-
ments are in charge of specific aspects of a firm’s agenda and deploy resources accordingly 
(Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Dougherty, 1992a). Finally, we know that the way resources are al-
tered depends on the interaction between managers at different hierarchy levels and across func-
tional roles (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Kaplan, 2008a; Jarzabkowski, 2003). However, much work 
remains to better understand what resources are, how resources are understood, and how re-
source alterations unfold while considering a firm’s idiosyncratic task environments. Thus, 
the purpose of this dissertation is to extend theory on how resource under-
standings and resource alterations unfold within and between a firm’s differ-
ent task environments.  
To achieve this purpose, this dissertation investigates what a resource understanding consti-
tutes, what resource alteration activities actors in different task environments engage in, and the 
relationship between resource understandings and resource alterations. These key concepts are 
defined next, followed by a note on theory. 
1.3. A note on definitions 
Although it is difficult to answer what a resource is (cf. Wernerfelt, 1995), it is also necessary 
to make explicit definitions used in this dissertation. These definitions have evolved iteratively 
through literature reviews and the analysis of empirical data. 2 There are four key concepts used 
for the purpose above: resources, resource understandings, resource alteration, and task envi-
ronment. In this research study, these concepts are defined as follows:  
(1) Resources are inputs and/or outcomes of value generating activity. Resources are con-
sidered multidimensional and this dissertation focuses on three dimensions: asset char-
acteristics, enacted rule environments, and coordinated activity. 
(2) A resource understanding refers to how an actor working with a resource understands 
this resource and its potential uses. This includes an understanding of each of the three 
resource dimensions outlined in (1).  
(3) Resource alteration is a change related to either of the three resource dimensions outline 
in (1). 
(4) Task environment refers to the context of resource activities. The organization’s hierar-
chy levels represent its vertical task environments. Relatedly, its functional areas repre-
sent its horizontal task environments. Task environments are unique as they: (1) shape 
what is interpreted and how it is interpreted (Daft & Weick, 1984), (2) focus actor’s 
limited attention on issues and answers in context dependent ways (Ocasio, 1997), and 
(3) represent places where specific incentives, cultures, and routines, shape how coor-
dinated resource activities unfold (Ren, Kiesler, & Fussell, 2008). 
                                               
2 These definitions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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1.4. A note on theoretical perspectives 
There is a growing body of fine-grained studies that rely either on cognitive theory or on prac-
tice theory. Cognitive theory is focused on actors’ mental processes (e.g., attention, problem 
solving, thinking, perception etc.) and their mental representations (the hypothetical symbolic 
representation of external reality that exist in the mind). Practice theory is focused on how re-
ality is fundamentally constituted by social activity taking place in specific contexts. 
These two theoretical perspectives are incommensurable both in their ontology and their 
conceptualization of a resource as a theoretical construct. For instance, a resource cannot exist 
as a mental representation corresponding to an external reality at the same time as that re-
source’s existence is inextricably linked to that reality. Moreover, cognitive theory and practice 
theory disagree on what constitutes a resource understanding and what resource alteration in-
volves for actors who are members of different task environments. 
To illustrate the incommensurability between cognitive theory and practice theory, and how 
it matters, consider the following two studies. Danneels (2011) investigates how cognition ex-
plains why Smith Corona’s typewriter and mechanical calculator business areas were wiped out 
by electronic calculators and PCs. He concludes that managers had inaccurate resource sche-
mas, i.e., mental representations of their organization’s resources and the potential uses of these 
resources. This suggests that there exists a mapping between a mental representation of an ex-
ternal reality and the actual external reality such that this mapping can be judged in terms of its 
accuracy. Here, resource alteration is determined by mental representations of both resources 
and their value generating uses. In contrast, Feldman’s (2004: 295) proposal of a “practice-
based theory of organizational resourcing” suggests that resources are part of a cyclical process 
where assets enable actors to act in ways that enables the creation of new assets. Here, resource 
alteration is seen as an ongoing process where the generative mechanism of alteration is inher-
ent in a set of resource activities. In Danneels’ view, mental representations can be inaccurate 
and these inaccuracies need to be resolved to successfully alter resources. In Feldman’s view, 
resource understandings are, at most, pluralistic as opposed to more or less accurate. 
Cognitive theory and practice theory offer contradictory insights about what constitutes a 
resource understanding and about the relationship between resource understandings and re-
source alteration; they are ontologically incommensurable. While incommensurable, this dis-
sertation intends to use both and it argues that there exists at least two reasons for using both 
when conducting fine-grained investigations. 
The first reason relates to this dissertation’s practice oriented purpose, i.e., to investigate, 
with a fine-grained focus, how resource understandings and resource alteration unfold within a 
firm. Weick (1995) argues that conducting research at times necessitates a degree of ontological 
oscillation. This is true when ontological oscillation allows the researcher to “understand the 
actions of people in everyday life who could care less about ontology” (p. 35). Ontological 
oscillation has been used by empirical studies that explore resource understandings, resource 
alterations, and the relationship between them (cf. Dougherty, 1992a; Garud & Rappa, 1994). 
The second reason relates the benefits of including cognition in accounts of practice. Mar-
shall (2008, 2014) argues that combining cognitive theory and practice theory enables insights 
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into why practitioners carry out practices the way they do. Marshall (2014: 111) explains that 
a strict separation of the mental realm and the activity realm, while perhaps ontologically sound, 
leads to an “epistemologically impenetrable knot” which limits cumulative knowledge building. 
Chapter 2 elaborates further on the choice to combine cognitive theory and practice theory and 
develops this dissertation’s two research questions. 
1.5. The studies 
This dissertation is based on three studies. The first study, Study A, examined what asset char-
acteristics decision makers considered in the context of technology innovation for emerging 
market entry. The study revealed that decision makers altered resources based on their evolving 
perceptions of markets and asset characteristics. Paper I was developed based on these findings. 
The second study, Study B, followed the development and launch of a new corporate strat-
egy. The study revealed how the task environments of actors shape the way they assess and 
attempt to alter resources. Appended Papers III and IV were developed based on these findings. 
Paper III shows how attempts to reconfigure existing ways to deploy resources are bound to a 
practitioner’s task environment. Paper IV provides a fine-grained account of strategy work. It 
shows how new resource understandings emerge and escalate into cognitive conflicts. 
The third study, Study C, examined how product developers conduct technology develop-
ment in an environment subject to regulatory setbacks. It revealed discrepancies between formal 
rules and enacted rules and how these discrepancies are tied to task environments. These dif-
ferences caused tensions between actors, tensions that made it hard for them to respond to the 
external threat. Appended Paper II was developed based on these findings. 
This dissertation uses the above described studies to develop its main contribution: a theo-
retical model that depicts resource alteration as a perpetual cycle involving both cognitive di-
mensions and practice dimensions. 
1.6. The disposition 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 first introduces readers to economic theory and manage-
ment theory focused on resources, resource understandings, and resource alteration. Chapter 2 
then turns attention to cognitive theory and practice theory and uses these to develop two re-
search questions. Chapter 3 builds on insights from the previous chapter and develops an ana-
lytical framework of the resource alteration options that are available to a firm’s actors. Chapter 
4 first describes the research design and the research method, and then provides a personal 
account of the overall research journey. Chapter 5 presents a summary of the appended papers. 
Chapter 6 answers the research questions and discusses the empirical findings. Chapter 7 uses 
the empirical results to propose a cyclical model of resource alteration. Chapter 8 concludes 
this dissertation and offers advice to managers and suggestions for future research. 
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2. The research on resource alteration  
This chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the resource focused strategic manage-
ment literature. This overview serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it introduces readers to how re-
sources, resource understandings, and resource alteration have been conceptualized in the ex-
tant strategic management literature. Secondly, the overview highlights the three resource as-
pects that are of central concern to this dissertation’s fine-grained investigations: asset charac-
teristics, coordinated resource activities, and mental representations. The chapter concludes by 
critically evaluating how using both cognitive theory and practice theory can guide such fine-
grained investigations and develops this dissertation’s two research questions. 
2.1. A brief historical overview of resource focused theories 
2.1.1. Resources as part of mental representations: 1970s 
The studies of Dan Schendel and colleagues at Purdue University represent an early influx of 
resource related thinking from economics into strategic management. In their work, they as-
sume both resource heterogeneity and that resources have an inherent value that is mediated by 
mental representations.  
Schendel and Patton (1978) provide guidance to managers who need to choose between re-
source alteration options. The authors argue that managers must allocate scarce resources across 
various mutually exclusive performance goals that need to be balanced (these goals are com-
monly associated with specific functional areas and roles). Schendel and colleagues view re-
source alteration as an allocation of resources in a context of multiple goals. These goals are 
interdependent and the resources are discrete entities. For instance, money does not change as 
a resource when reallocated from an R&D budget to a marketing budget. 
Schendel and Patton (1978) provide a model that reveals the performance implications of 
managers’ mental representations of the relation between various performance variables (e.g., 
the firm’s resources). They state that: 
Management’s actions are guided by perceptions of the relationships between the 
resources at its disposal, constraints forming the competitive environment, and or-
ganizational goals and objectives. These perceptions are based largely on experi-
ence and past performance (Schendel & Patton, 1978: 1620–1621, my emphasis). 
The authors make explicit that it is mental representations that guide managers’ actions and that 
these representations are shaped by managers’ past activity. Note that it is not the resources that 
are perceived but the relationship between resources and other variables (cf. Penrose, 1959). 
2.1.2. Resources as a firm’s main source of rents: 1980s 
One of the more significant developments in 1980s was the emergence of the RBV. Werner-
felt’s (1984) article “A Resource-based View of the Firm” departs from Penrose’s (1959) con-
ceptualization of firms as bundles of resources, and conceptualizes resources using Porter’s 
(1980) structure-conduct-performance perspective and Andrews’ (1971) work on the strengths 
and weaknesses of particular resource positions. 
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In Wernerfelt’s work, resources are central to a firm’s performance. He emphasizes asset 
characteristics as the locus of value generation. Wernerfelt investigates the asset characteristics 
that make a given resource part of a dependence and is interested in why certain resources 
enable performance advantages. To Wernerfelt, asset characteristics that enable resource posi-
tion barriers (an analogue to Porter’s entry barriers)—either through some perceived distinctive 
benefit or through cost advantages (cf. Conner, 1991)—will enable a firm to generate above 
average rents from its resource activities. 
While Wernerfelt’s conceptualization of resources builds on Penrose’s work, it does not in-
clude her focus on mental representations as mediators between asset characteristics and pro-
ductive opportunities. Instead, Wernerfelt conceptualizes resources as having an inherent value 
generating potential. From this perspective the “distinctiveness in the product offering or low 
costs are tied directly to distinctiveness in the inputs—resources—used to produce the prod-
ucts” (Conner, 1991: 132). 
In general, attention in the RBV is focused on abstract asset characteristics that enable per-
sistent performance advantages—i.e., characteristics that make a resource valuable, rare, inim-
itable, and non-substitutable (VRIN)—and not on the resource itself (Barney, 2001). 
2.1.3. Resources as components of a coordinated production system: 
1980s–1990s 
Teece (1982) argues that firms use resources in unique ways by drawing on their firm specific 
routines and experiences. He draws on Nelson and Winter’s (1982a) evolutionary theory, which 
focuses on experiential learning codified as organizational routines. This evolutionary view 
suggests that a firm’s specific characteristics are acquired over time through its experiences 
(i.e., Lamarckian inheritance). Teece focuses on the resources that a firm can ‘discover’ through 
experiential learning and ‘develop’ through routines (see also Barney, 1991).  
Following Wernerfelt (1984) and Teece (1982), the resource focused strategic management 
research increasingly treats resources as the de facto locus of competitive advantage (cf. Kraai-
jenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010). Subsequent work focuses on how resources link to perfor-
mance. Researchers argue for the benefits of monopolistic control over scarce resources, where 
these resources are necessary for a wide range of downstream producers, and where there exist 
no obvious substitutes. Researchers argue also that resources with these benefits can enable 
sustained performance benefits. For instance, Dierickx and Cool (1989) discuss resources in 
the context of asset accumulation and points to benefits related to degrees of substitutability 
and imitability. Asset characteristics and a production system that can utilize complementarities 
between these asset characteristics are brought to the fore. 
By the 1990s, the RBV had risen to a dominant position within the resource focused strategic 
management literature and kept its objectified view on resources. The resource based theory 
proposed by Grant (1991) builds on the foundations set by Wernerfelt, Teece, and Barney in 
terms of the properties of valuable resources. In Grant’s work, the role of routines as a source 
of new knowledge is brought to the fore. Grant’s argument is that managers can identify and 
classify resources and appreciate strengths and weakness of these resources in a fairly straight 
forward way. The advantages a firm enjoys comes from identifying firm capabilities where 
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resources act as inputs. These capabilities are extended when managers decide to expand the 
boundaries of the firm’s activities. As new things are done over time, these things become new 
capabilities by the simple mechanism of accumulated experience of them being done. With the 
knowledge gained, new complementarities with existing (and new) resources unlock (see also 
Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). 
The routines perspective shows how a firm’s unique history matters for its resource under-
standings and resource alterations. However, it treats Penrose’s (1959) focus on mental repre-
sentations as peripheral. This is not to say that the concept of mental representations does not 
feature in the 1980s–1990s RBV literature. In some cases, mental representations are afforded 
a brief mention. For instance, Peteraf (1993) mentions managers’ perceptions of the benefits of 
resource enabled choices (see Peteraf’s discussion on the ex ante limits to competition). Ma-
honey and Pandian (1992) argue that “this notion that the firm’s current resources influence 
managerial perceptions and hence the direction of growth is a cognitive proposition” (p. 365).  
In other cases, cognitive processes are brought to the fore. For instance, Ginsberg (1994) 
makes an explicit attempt to link mental models of managers to sustained competitive ad-
vantage. Ginsberg builds his argument on the recognition that actors are cognitively limited 
which both constrain their ability to make rational resource related choices (Amit & Schoe-
maker, 1993), and underlie differential firm performance (Schoemaker, 1990). He argues for a 
focus on “the cognitive and social processes through which human and organization resources 
are converted in group capabilities” (p. 155). Studies also investigate managers’ perceptions 
about their firm’s external environment (e.g., Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Ginsberg, 
1990), theorize about what is a feasible alteration given an organization’s existing resources 
(Ginsberg, 1994), and focus on cognitive capacity (Ginsberg, 1990). Notably, these investiga-
tions do not explore mental representations of resources per se. 
2.1.4. Resources that alter other resources: 1990s–2000s 
In the 1990s, DC researchers began focusing on those organizational resources that enables the 
purposeful alteration of other resources during times of change (cf. Helfat et al., 2007). The DC 
literature is vast and has changed its focus since its inception (for recent reviews see Wang & 
Ahmed, 2007; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Vogel & Güttel, 2013). But it is 
founded on two main schools: (1) the Eisenhardt school, which considers the ability to alter 
resources as rooted in processes and rules (cf. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), and (2) the Teece 
school, which considers the ability to alter resources as rooted in firm specific routines (cf. 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  
Both the Eisenhardt school and the Teece school build on evolutionary theory (Arndt & 
Bach, 2015; Galvin, Rice, & Liao, 2014, 2015). While neither emphasizes mental representa-
tions, the Eisenhardt school mentions divergence in ‘thought worlds.’ Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) argue that coordination is important because it “enhance[s] innovation by breaking down 
the thought worlds that arise because people with different expertise not only know different 
things, but know those things differently” (p. 1109). They argue that there exist best practice 
routines aimed to bring together task environment specific experiences and knowledge “by 
which managers alter their resource base” (p. 1111). In both schools, routines are specific to 
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firms. While this specificity is emphasized in the Teece school, the Eisenhardt school also 
acknowledges it through idiosyncratic enactments of best practice routines. 
The Eisenhardt school focuses on the coordination mechanisms by which variation in 
‘thought worlds’ matters. By contrast, the Teece school is Lamarckian in that routines are car-
riers of firm-specific acquired traits.3 The Eisenhardt school is distinct also in its focus on the 
evolutionary elements of adaptation and specialization. Here, the pace of industry change de-
termines the evolutionary path of firms. Eisenhardt and Martin argue that stable environments 
promote variation (analogous to how species adapt to become specialized to a specific resource 
in a stable environment) whereas dynamic environments favor generalists (due to the necessity 
to be flexible in changing environments). The authors focus specifically on intra-firm variation 
and argue that temporary performance advantages rest on a firm’s ability to quickly develop or 
adapt ways of working with idiosyncratic resource endowments. Note how this applies both in 
stable environments—where specialization affords resource utilization benefits (similar to how 
Williamson (1991) views economizing)—and dynamic environments—where adaptation ena-
bles quick moves from obsolete resource deployments to competitive ones.  
Later work focuses on organizational learning. For instance, Zollo and Winter (2002) argue 
that firm specific routines develop both as a result of experiential learning and as a result of 
more cognitive backward-looking codification of knowledge. Zollo and Winter propose that 
constructive confrontations between individuals with different viewpoints are important to de-
velop a collective understanding of actions and their performance implications. This is im-
portant because it allows a shift from Lamarckian heredity to Mendelian heredity, i.e., it high-
lights how individual interaction determines variation, selection, and retention. However, Zollo 
and Winter are not interested in individuals per se. They see constructive confrontations as a 
means by which causal ambiguity around action-performance links can be reduced. 
2.1.5. Resources and the cognitive micro-foundations turn: 2000s–2010s 
As research continued, criticism emerged against the mainstream resource views in strategic 
management literature. The literature is criticized for its inadequate consideration of Penrose’s 
(1959) focus on subjective resource value and mental representations (cf. Foss, 1998a, 1999; 
Becerra, 2008). Penrose (1959) argues that to understand what managers actually do when they 
attempt to alter resources, we need to bring to the foreground their ability to focus attention, to 
subjectively link resources to opportunities of productive uses, and to subsequently pursue these 
opportunities (Foss, 1999). Thus, not including mental representations is problematic if we are 
to develop a fine-grained understanding of resource related activity. 
An additional criticism against resource focused strategic management theories is that they 
do not make clear how a firm’s actors know, or can know, what VRIN resources are ex ante, 
thereby risking tautological definitions of resources (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). It is also not 
clear how these inputs should be, and are, linked to performance generating actions (Barney & 
Arikan, 2001). Consider, for instance, Peteraf and Barney’s (2003: 311) argument that a firm’s 
                                               
3 Galvin et al. (2015: 697) note that few papers actively consider evolutionary theory in a modern Darwinian sense. 
They argue that “the classic Darwinian cycle of variation-selection-retention is often not even apparent in many 
of the papers applying the [dynamic capabilities view] to different fields.” 
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resources have “intrinsically different levels of efficiency.” It is not clear how these insights 
can aid in the daily activities of managers who may not be able to see what is intrinsically held 
by a resource. Mahoney (1995: 97) argues that coarse-grained advice is inadequate because 
they “cannot articulate management practices that will enable firms to earn rents.” Mahoney 
argues also that to help managers working with resources, researchers need to develop theory 
that includes both mental representations and patterned resource activities. To provide such 
advice, researchers need to know what a resource actually is, how resource understandings and 
resource alterations unfold, or how resources are created in the first place (Foss, 1998b; see also 
Regnér, 2008; Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). 
As a response, the micro-foundations turn in strategic management set out to investigate the 
micro-level mechanisms behind resource related activities. Depending on the perspective these 
investigations draw on, researchers view and explain resource related micro-foundations dif-
ferently. Some draw on behavioral traditions and evolutionary economics to conceptually ex-
plore the direction between micro-macro outcomes (Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008). Others, build-
ing on the same evolutionary and behavioral roots, argue for enterprise-level sensing, seizing, 
and reconfiguring skills that mainly focus on processes, rules, and structures (Teece, 2007). 
In turn, those who focus on the cognitive micro-foundations are divided into two main liter-
ature streams. The first stream focuses on managerial cognitive capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 
2003; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). These authors focus on managers’ capacity to receive data from 
an environment and subsequently analyze these data to inform resource alteration decisions. 
They focus specifically on managerial capabilities that can “build, integrate, reconfigure, and 
competitively reposition organizational resources and capabilities” (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015: 
931). Relatedly, Eisenhardt, Furr, and Bingham (2010) explore heuristics and higher order 
thinking, e.g., abstraction, variety, and interruption. In this first stream, focus lies on the cogni-
tive processes that inform resource activities. The second stream within the cognitive micro-
foundations literature focuses on resource related mental representations. For instance, Gavetti 
(2005) explores how mental representations and hierarchy direct search activities. In turn, Dan-
neels (2011) investigates how mental representations of resources shape the direction of re-
source alteration. He focuses on the mental representations of asset characteristics, and their 
potential uses, that influence the direction of resource alteration choices. 
There are overlaps between the two cognitive micro-foundations streams, but researchers 
often emphasize one stream over the other. For instance, Helfat and Peteraf (2015: 832) 
acknowledge language, social cognition, and the relationship between mental maps and the 
mental activities that utilize and alter mental maps, but focus specifically on “the capacity of 
individual managers to perform mental activities.” Together, the two cognitive micro-founda-
tions streams establish that it is not asset characteristics per se that matter for how resources are 
altered. Instead, attention is drawn to mental representations of resources and their potential 
uses, and to the cognitive capabilities linked to these mental representations (for an argument 
of the link see Ginsberg, 1990, 1994). 
Within this micro-foundations research, there also exists studies based on what seems to be 
a mix between evolutionary economics and Austrian economics. In these studies, both mental 
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activity/representations and routines/rules matter. For instance, Feldman (2000) argues that rou-
tines have both emergent path dependent properties that are evolutionary in nature, but also 
effortful properties that are more cognitive. Feldman and Pentland (2003) argue that the more 
ostensive aspects of routines denote abstract patterns that actors use to guide the specific actions 
involved in these routines. Relatedly, Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) argue that strategy work 
involves both an effortful forward-looking, where future consequences are mentally processed, 
and a backward-looking reliance on experience (for the cognitive role in backward-looking see 
also Zollo & Winter, 2002). Similarly, Gavetti and Rivkin (2007) argue that search is situated 
in both practical action and cognition. Finally, Salvato (2009) focuses on the day-to-day activ-
ities of the actors involved in product development and shows how resource alteration is a pro-
cess where cognitive elements and routine elements are inextricably linked.  
Next follows a synthesis of the literature overview and the identification of three resource 
aspects that will guide this dissertation’s investigations. 
2.2. A synthesis and a way forward 
Figure 1 presents a synthesis of the discussion above. As Hodgkinson and Healey (2011: 1501) 
argue “there is no question that the dominant perspectives in classic and contemporary strategic 
management emanate from the field of economics” (see also Conner, 1991). Therefore, the 
development depicted in Figure 1 departs from evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 
1974) and Austrian economics (Penrose, 1959). Figure 1 then covers the theories mentioned in 
the overview above and concludes with the recent micro-foundations literature. 
This dissertation builds on three resource related aspects identified in the extant literature: 
asset characteristics, coordinated resource activities, and mental representations. This disserta-
tion develops its findings based on cognitive theory and practice theory. As cognitive theory 
and its micro-foundations view on resources has been reviewed above, the text below will first 
introduce practice theory and then contrast cognitive theory and practice theory to consider their 
respective strengths and weaknesses as well as their incongruences and complementarities. Two 
research questions are then developed. 
2.2.1. How practice theory can inform fine-grained investigations 
Practice theory contrasts mainstream cognitive theory. The mainstream cognitive research 
views resource alteration as discrete patterned activities where resources (also discrete entities) 
have asset characteristics that actors (themselves discrete entities) understand with varying de-
grees of accuracy, and alter resources accordingly.4 Calls have been made for a more explicit 
focus on the social, cultural, and material contexts of cognition; where meaning is not made 
solely in the mind of something external to the mind (e.g., Hutchins, 2010; Rocha, 2012). An 
emphasis on the contextual and situated nature of cognition suggests that meaning is not some-
thing an actor makes of an environment, but rather something that is carried by the environment.
                                               
4 The mainstream focus within cognition on information processing over a more contextual and dynamic treatment 
of cognition is not due to ignorance of these factors, but has important methodological roots. Contextual dynamics 
was too difficult to account for at the embryonic stages of the field (Hutchins, 2010). 
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While the cognitive literature is not unified in their treatment of these ideas,5 practice research-
ers consider them focal in their studies. 
There exist multiple practice theories (Nicolini, 2012). Common to all is that they do not 
acknowledge dualism, i.e., the existence of a mental realm that is detached from the world of 
activity (Lave, 1988). Practice researchers do not view the world as a source of information to 
be rationally processed (however bounded this rationality may be), where resource understand-
ings are outcomes of mental activity. For practice researchers, information does not attain 
meaning in the mind. Meaning is instead shaped by the specific task environment in which 
cognition takes place and is influenced by formal norms, rules, and routines that affect the way 
information is framed and interpreted (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Marshall, 2008). 
The context explains the existence of idiosyncratic thought worlds, or as Dougherty (1992a: 
182) argues: actors “engaged in a certain domain of activity [have] a shared understanding about 
that activity.” From a practice perspective, it is unlikely that there exists a correct way of un-
derstanding resources as actors' understandings are contextual. Practice theory rejects a view of 
reality as a set of abstract linked variables (cf. Weick, 2003: 467). Instead, a practice approach 
to studying managerial activity would consider meaning as a relational “totality into which 
practitioners are immersed” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011: 341). Here, the context and the situ-
ated nature of being shapes meaning to a significant degree. 
Practice theorists also focus on dynamics. For instance, Orlikowski’s (2002) study of product 
development shifts attention away from knowledge (connoting elements, processes, disposi-
tions, and outcomes) as a resource, to knowing (connoting doing and practice) as an ongoing 
social accomplishment. Broadly speaking, a resource from a practice perspective can be under-
stood as a component of the arranged entities that make out the materiality of social activity (cf. 
Schatzki, 2002). For instance, a whiteboard, a computer, a flash drive, seats for an audience, a 
laser pointer may all become resources used for the practice of giving a research presentation.6  
By purposefully eschewing any presupposed asset characteristic inherent to resources and 
rejecting the idea that resources exist as independent entities, practice researchers focus on the 
resource dynamics involved in ongoing organizational reality. They do so by investigating the 
everyday activities of practitioners over time (cf. Regnér, 2003, 2015; Gillespie & Zittoun, 
2010). Here, reality is situational and represents a nexus of activities and relational totalities 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). A resource within practice research is sociomaterially configured 
by the practices that involve actors, skills, places, instruments, activities, etc. As such, resource 
realities are “thoroughly constituted by contingent practices” (Orlikowski, 2015: 38) and are 
pluralistic (Jarzabkowski, 2004). As an example, consider Mol’s (2002) examination of how 
                                               
5 For instance, Gerard P. Hodgkinson’s frontiers in MOC keynote speech in 2012 mentions how neuroscience 
makes it possible to locate mental representations in the brain, how the cognitive and the affective interrelate, and 
how distributed cognition unfolds in multiteam settings (cf. Healey, Hodgkinson, & Teo, 2009).  
6 This dissertation distinguishes between entities that enable situated action for a particular practitioner in a par-
ticular task environment at a particular time, and the entities that are involved in value exchanges between firms 
as conceptualized in the economics and management literatures (e.g., human resources, capital resources, natural 
resource). Thus, the focus is on what Melin (in Johnson et al., 2007: 217) refer to as “the most critical type of 
strategizing [that] includes activities and practices that eventually lead to a major strategic renewal.” 
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practice determines what a particular cardiovascular disease, atherosclerosis, is to different ac-
tors. Those working in the Pathology department consider atherosclerosis as an abnormal thick-
ness of the inner coating of the artery. It is something that they experience through studies 
through a microscope. In contrast, doctors working in the clinic consider atherosclerosis as part 
of a diagnosis based on patient complaints. They experience atherosclerosis through patient 
interaction and through medical tests. 
For practice theorists, objective entities and discrete states do not exist (cf. Sandberg & Tsou-
kas, 2011). Actors do not hold mental representations of resources, i.e., resource schemas. They 
hold schemata of resource actions. These are internalized practices that shape action through 
socioculturally and historically shaped tendencies and dispositions (Chia & MacKay, 2007). 
Schemata of resource actions are inextricably tied to what practitioners in a task environment 
take for granted and how they experience a given resource in everyday use. This is a habitual 
practical understanding that may not be available for conscious recall (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 
2009), and that is determined by the set of organized actions and arranged entities at a given 
site of social coexistence (Schatzki, 2002). 
For practice researchers, routines are not solely experiential where their meaning is assessed 
through retrospective accounts and constructive confrontations (cf. Zollo & Winter, 2002). In-
stead, routines are firm-specific adaptations of broader macro-practices (Johnson et al., 2007). 
In contrast to Zollo and Winter’s (2002) general reference to performance evaluation, debrief-
ing sessions, and collective discussions, practice scholars focus on these activities and treat 
them as situated and contextual. Practice researchers do not focus on the performance outcomes 
of various activities, but rather why exactly these activities unfold as they do, when they do. 
Practice researchers view routines and rules as reflections of higher level practices, and cog-
nition as taking place in an information environment where that environment carries meaning. 
Practice research centers on how resource understandings and resource alteration unfolds by 
including a focus on specific task environments, situated activity, and cognitive contexts (Jar-
zabkowski, 2005; Regnér, 2008). Practice research can contribute to our otherwise “limited 
accounts of the dynamics involved in the build-up, development and change of organizational 
assets (i.e. resources and capabilities)” (Regnér, 2008: 566). It is also suitable for fine-grained 
studies because practice research centers on activity configurations, situated social contexts, 
and social interaction across multiple task environments (Regnér, 2008).  
Activity configurations are particularly interesting as they include “specific combinations of 
certain actors, socio-cultural contexts, cognitive frames, artifacts, and structural properties” 
(Regnér, 2008: 574). Regnér argues that activity configurations are suitable as a unit of analysis 
because this “permits a fine-grained examination of specific ingredients, which in combination 
may build new organizational assets” (p. 574). Activity configurations allows us to uncover 
actors’ predispositions (Regnér, 2008), how deviations between individual and professional 
norms act as a source of resource heterogeneity (Jonsson & Regnér, 2009), and how external 
bodies shape rules and routines (Regnér, 2008). Activity configurations can also inform our 
understanding of the dual nature of conscious and non-conscious resource alteration activity 
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(Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Note that while cognitive theory and practice theory conceptu-
alizes resource understandings differently, they both acknowledge the simultaneous existence 
of non-conscious activity as well as conscious activity.7 
2.2.2. A reflection on cognitive theory and practice theory 
One major issue with practice theory is its strong emphasis on ontology at the expense of prag-
matism—an issue which practice scholars are aware of (cf. Johnsson et al., 2007; Golsorkhi et 
al., 2015). Consider for instance the notion within practice theory that resources do not have an 
existence outside of any relational totality in sites of social coexistence. How exactly does this 
help a practitioner? What plan of action would he or she draft? Provide instead a simple SWOT 
template or a Five Forces framework and strategy work can commence. It is somewhat ironic 
that practice theory, while perhaps ontologically more appealing, fails to spur action in the way 
that an Andrewsean or Porterean influenced framework does, despite the fact (or perhaps be-
cause) the latter two are based on a questionable resource ontology. Again, Weick (1995) comes 
to mind; people seem to care little of the ontological nature of their daily work. 
A sole reliance on practice theory is epistemologically difficult and hard to turn into action-
able advice. Clearly, it seems that resources have some inherent properties that are objective 
and independent of agency (De Gregori 1987) and where technical features exist independently 
of human activity (cf. Orlikowski, 2000; Barley, 1986). Coal burns. Gold is malleable. People 
can be creative with how they use features of a new technology. And a brand carries with it 
association that can be leveraged across product groups. These aspects of resources (or similarly 
the characteristics and capabilities of specific technologies) seem to exist and, in some sense, 
to be real. But a practice view rejects the idea of resources (or collective patterned activities 
involving resources) as interacting independent entities (Barad, 2003; De Gregori, 1987). Re-
sources neither exist in their properties (e.g., being malleable), nor do they enter a permanent 
state of resources through human activity such as combination and transformation (e.g., a gold 
neckless). Instead, resources are brought into being through activity and in turn enable activity 
in specific moments, shifting the emphasis from resource as a noun to resourcing as a gerund 
(Feldman, 2004; Feldman & Worline, 2011; Quinn & Worline, 2008; Howard-Grenville, 2007). 
As Scott and Orlikowski (2009) point out, asset characteristics are relational and enacted in 
practice and therefore only relevant when used. 
Note that the word ‘relevant’ does not signify existence, only meaningfulness. In other 
words, resources may exist, in part, independent of practice, but the term ‘resource’ is relevant 
only when practiced. Value is produced in the moment. Assets enabling this value production 
can exist outside of value production. And since a resource is an asset that is involved in a set 
of value generating activities, resources also come into being in the moment of their value gen-
eration (cf. De Gregori, 1987). Since value is subjective (Menger, 1871), an asset can be viewed 
as one or more resources depending on the actor. However, consider again how this affects the 
                                               
7 This duality lies at the frontiers of cognitive research as evidenced by the topic of the 2017 New Horizons in 
Managerial and Organization Cognition workshop, i.e., “Methodological challenges and advances in managerial 
and organizational cognition,” where one major area of interest is the subconscious/automatic construct. There 
exist also other word pairs to describe similar constructs, e.g., reflective and reflexive, Type 1 and Type 2, auto-
matic and deliberate, conscious and non-conscious etc. In this dissertation, these are treated as synonymous. 
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advice we as scholars give managers. In everyday life, it is a practical necessity to consider both 
value generation in the moment as well as the consideration of future moments. It is, in part, 
this necessity that demands that we allow an ontological oscillation in order to provide action-
able advice to managers. 
Finally, while the critique against cognition is fair insofar that representations should be 
considered as more dynamic and that environmental information is not devoid of meaning, it is 
also fair to criticize a view of practice as the sole locus of meaning and behavior. The issue here 
is that the practice-based literature has pushed cognition to the background and instead relies 
on ideas of socially shared predispositions that enable practices. Practitioners are either seen as 
unconsciously guided by a repository of practical coping (Chia & MacKay, 2007), some un-
specified mindful sense of the practical reality (Giddens, 1984; Bourdieu, 1990), a knowledge 
of the norms and routines necessary for the enactment of practice that practitioners naturally 
prefer over others as it provides them with ontological security (Giddens, 1984), or some extra-
individual collective memory (Bourdieu, 1990).  
Somewhat harshly stated, while the mainstream cognitive literature views information as 
devoid of meaning prior to mental processing, the practice literature views the actual processing 
as devoid of representational thought. Here, meaning is instead shared and negotiated and part 
of some extra-individual realm that actors can gain access to or are part of. Marshall (2008, 
2014) argues that including cognition in accounts of practice provides insights into how it is 
that practitioners carry out practices the way they do.8 He further argues that:  
Without any real acknowledgement of the dynamic processes of cognition, through 
which patterns of thinking are established and updated, practice-based theories 
struggle to explain how the equally patterned and largely routine character of social 
conduct can be sustained (Marshall, 2008: 415). 
Marshall (2008, 2014), Hodgkinson and Clarke (2007), and Jarzabkowski (2004) have laid the 
conceptual groundwork for studies investigating the interplay between individual-level cogni-
tion and higher-level contexts and Marshall (2014), Hodgkinson and Clarke (2007), and Hodg-
kinson and Healey (2011) explore the interplay between the conscious and the non-conscious. 
Their efforts are complemented by Balogun and Johnsson’s (2004) empirical investigations of 
how strategy practices underlie sensemaking processes that change mental representations. 
Similarly, Melin (in Johnson et al., 2007: 216) argues that a “practice perspective is certainly 
relevant to both the thinking and the acting side of strategizing.” 
Furthermore, the theoretical foundations of practice research builds strongly on work that 
allows for cognition. Consider for instance Weick’s notion of ‘sensemaking,’ i.e., “the ongoing 
retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing” (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 409); Goffman’s conceptualization of frames where cognition is 
                                               
8 To consider activity as non-representational is also problematic if we consider the recent literature on how the 
brain performs thinking (cf. Evans, 2008; Lieberman, 2007), how brain activity changes as novel things become 
habitual (Camarer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005), and how the practice of strategy—i.e., strategizing—and cog-
nition are linked (cf. Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007). 
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situated in individual interaction in certain occasions that change over time (Lemert & Brana-
man, 1997); and Giddens’s (1979: 5) “duality of structure” concept where practices (as collec-
tive patterned activities) constitute social reality, and where cognizant practitioners take part in 
the ongoing effortful (re)production of practices. Cognition, regardless if carried by practice or 
not, here mediates the way practitioners act over time in such fields of practice. In sum, it is 
both possible and at times favorable to combine both theories to inform empirical findings. 
2.2.3. Exemplary studies using both cognitive theory and practice theory 
Two exemplary studies illustrate how using both cognitive theory and practice theory can in-
form research. The first is Garud and Rappa’s (1994) work on developing a socio-cognitive 
model of technology evolution. They show that two research groups—one from 3M and the 
other from Nucleus—developed cochlear implants along two different technology trajectories 
(single-channel and multi-channel). The technology trajectory is linked to how the two research 
groups interpreted two key dimensions required for FDA approval: safety and efficacy.  
Garud and Rappa argue that there is a relationship between the beliefs researchers hold about 
technical feasibility, the technological artifacts they create, and the evaluation routines they 
create and use. The authors show that the two research groups designed evaluation routines for 
assessing safety and efficacy based on their beliefs regarding what constitutes safety and effi-
cacy. The two research groups then developed technological artifacts reflecting their beliefs 
and their assessment routines. However, when the evaluation routines were employed, they in 
turn reinforced the researchers’ beliefs. Over time, evaluation routines, which are organization 
specific adaptations of practices, “become the basis for constructing individual reality” and 
“technological claims are perceived as relevant only to those who employ the same routines 
while appearing as noise to those who employ different routines” (Garud and Rappa, 1994: 
344). Here, evaluation criteria are shaped by researchers’ assessments of key functions (Garud 
& Rappa, 1994; Garud & Ahlström, 1997) that become the basis of construction of a local 
reality (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Garud & Rappa, 1994; Garud & Ahlström, 1997). 
Dougherty’s (1992a, 1992b) research also shows the benefits of considering both practice 
and cognition. Her work is especially relevant for this dissertation as she shows that local real-
ities can emerge even within a firm across its departments and functional areas, i.e., laterally 
distinct task environments. Dougherty’s work focuses specifically on product innovation, but 
has implications for our understanding of resource alteration.  
Dougherty (1992a) draws on Fleck (1979) and argues that the differences between what ac-
tors know make it difficult for these actors to share ideas and reach agreement around what is 
important. This applies to a wide range of phenomena, including scientific discovery (Fleck, 
1979), product innovation (Dougherty, 1992a), or as argued in this dissertation: resource alter-
ation. Dougherty shows that cognition guides activities such as coordinating and sharing. In 
addition, Dougherty mentions that what actors know is mediated by how actors know. She ar-
gues that each thought world houses an “internally shared system of meaning” that directs learn-
ing based on “common procedures, judgements, and methods” (Dougherty, 1992a: 182). In her 
view, activity also guides cognition. Her view on this reciprocal relationship between cognition 
and practice suggests that coordinating resource activities between task environments is hard 
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because actors simply cannot agree on what a particular resource is, beyond an agreement that 
a particular coordinated activity is taking place (see also Feldman, 2003). 
Dougherty (1992b: 79) argues that there exists “a feasible set of attributes at a particular time 
that a product needs to manifest to be viable” (note the analogy to market viable resource com-
binations in Lachmann, 1956). The problem for product innovators, she argues, is to locate this 
feasible set quickly and to profit from it before dynamic market forces renders the set obsolete. 
Dougherty includes consideration of both mental representations and actual activity. Note how 
she describes the process of locating a viable set of product attributes: 
[T]he products attributes cannot be specified easily and could change over time. At 
the same time, the product and /or manufacturing technology may be new, which 
means that technical problems may crop up unexpectedly, or that certain attributes 
cannot be delivered at all. Product innovators must experiment with sets of attrib-
utes, work closely with customers, pursue multiple paths at once, and make discon-
tinuous leaps in imagination as they attempt to craft the comprehensive package of 
market and technology issues into a viable product (p. 78). 
For very innovative products the feasible set may be nebulous and shifting as the 
market and technology both emerge interactively over a period of years. For other 
product ideas there may be no feasible set, and discovering this fact as quickly as 
possible is also a positive outcome (p. 79). 
Dougherty here considers cognition in terms of ideas and imaginations of feasible sets. This 
resembles Penrose’s (1959) notion of images of markets and the links between firm resources 
and productive opportunities. Dougherty considers also the practice of product innovation. She 
elaborates on activities such as visceralization, feasibility assessment, and fit assessment. Most 
notably, she considers the relationship between cognition and practice to be a reciprocal one. 
Consequently, mental representations differ depending on a particular actor’s area of expertise.  
2.3. The knowledge gap and the research questions 
Functional areas are laterally distinct task environments. In her work, Dougherty (1992b) spe-
cifically avoids considering functional areas because of how this segments issues into functional 
area clusters and black-boxes the content and process of knowledge accumulation—i.e., how 
understandings evolve and shape the search of feasible product attribute sets.  
However, in avoiding to consider functional areas in her framework, Dougherty’s account 
of market-technology knowledge creation oversees one crucial element: that of divergent as-
sessments of feasibility. As Garud and Rappa demonstrate, product developers may come up 
with very different assessments of feasibility. These differences cannot be attributed to omis-
sion of visceralization as both development teams who developed cochlear implants engaged 
in that activity—i.e., imagined the product in use, conducted trials and experiments, developed 
several iterations—to a significant degree. The two teams of product developers arguably 
shared both what they know and how they know and yet reached different conclusions around 
what constitutes a feasible set of product attributes. This raises questions about the ability of 
actors from different functional areas to reach agreement on feasibility. In the context of 
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Dougherty’s studies, i.e., product development, capabilities are functional area specific (Eisen-
hardt & Martin, 2000) and feasibility assessment is “richly grounded in expertise and profes-
sional know-how” (Dougherty, 1992b: 84). In such contexts, disagreements may remain unno-
ticed. But resource alteration often involves coordinated resource activities linking multiple 
functional areas (Javidan, 1998), which makes actors more likely to notice disagreements. 
At present, it remains difficult to understand why some firms are successful in altering their 
resources when environments change. And while recent developments in cognitive theory pro-
vide the possibility of empirically investigating resource alteration, it is ontologically question-
able to adopt a bounded rationality view of resources as independent entities. However, to avoid 
all separation of the mental realm and the activity realm, while perhaps ontologically sound, 
leads to what Marshall (2014: 111) refers to an “epistemologically impenetrable knot.” There-
fore, this dissertation relies on both cognitive theory and practice theory to inform its fine-
grained investigations of resource understandings and resource alteration.  
The above mentioned knowledge gap motivates the following two research questions: 
RQ1: How do task environment specific resource understandings shape re-
source alterations?   
RQ2: How does the task environment specific practice of resource alteration 
shape resource understandings? 
So far this literature review has focused on theoretical conceptualizations of resources, re-
source understandings, and resource alteration. This has been helpful to introduce the two focal 
theories used in this dissertation, i.e., cognitive theory and practice theory, and to develop its 
two research questions. The next chapter develops an analytical framework. The framework 
draws on the extant literatures’ conceptualization of resources as assets characteristics, task 
environments coordinated through rules and routines as firm-specific adaptations of practice, 
and mental representations of asset characteristics and their potential value generating uses. 
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3. Developing an analytical framework 
Chapter 3 builds on the three resource aspects identified in the extant literature and develops an 
analytical framework. By clarifying both what resources are and what resource alteration op-
tions are available to a firm’s actors, the framework aids in the analysis and discussion of this 
dissertation’s empirical findings. 
3.1. The three resources aspects in resource focused theories 
Resource focused theories generally agree that resources exist as independent entities and that 
resources are linked to the production of value. These theories differ, however, in their assump-
tions of how firms relate to resources and value, and how resources and value relate to each 
other. Below I use these differences to develop an analytical framework. 
Table 1 provides a comparison of three groups of resource focused theories of the firm and 
how they conceptualize resources, value, and the link between resources and value. While there 
are significant overlaps between the three groups of theories, they differ in their emphasis on 
three resource aspects: assets characteristics, resource activities involving several task environ-
ments that are coordinated through rules and routines, and mental representations of productive 
opportunities stemming from past experiences and existing resources. 
Theories in the first group is strongest in its focus on assets and asset characteristics. For 
instance, transaction cost economics (TCE) builds on the notion of asset specificity (cf. Wil-
liamson, 1983). Asset specificity refers to the inter-party relationships present in transactions. 
It relates to the extent to which an asset with certain characteristics can support value in a par-
ticular transaction when compared to an alternative use of that asset. In TCE, resources are 
conceptualized as objective entities with given asset characteristics. Similarly, RBV scholars 
like Barney (1986, 1991), Wernerfelt (1984), Peteraf (1993), Dierickx and Cool (1989) empha-
size resources with VRIN characteristics. As described in Chapter 2, these theories emphasize 
coordinated resource activities and treat the role of cognition as peripheral. 
Theories in the second group contrast to the first group by primarily emphasizing the coor-
dinated production systems—i.e., the interaction between people and technology in a work-
place—that transforms and combines assets. Here, routines and rules link and integrate various 
task environments and the unique knowledge that resides within these task environments (Nel-
son & Winter, 1974; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). The second group shares an empha-
sis on a firm’s specific routines and competences. These routines and competences enables a 
firm to both create and capture value.  This second group of resource focused theories argue 
that while asset characteristics have a value generating potential, this value potential needs to 
be realized by a specific production system. 
The third group shares the view of resources as assets with certain characteristics, but focuses 
on the productive opportunities these asset characteristics enable. A key distinction of Austrian 
economics is its primary emphasis on the subjective aspects of value (Menger, 1871). Here, 
actors in various task environments perceive resources differently and therefore can pursue dif-
ferent productive opportunities, i.e., they differ in their ability to turn cost into value. Value is 
neither inherent in the resource nor the output of a finely tuned routinized production system.
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Instead, managers’ mental representations determine how value is subjectively perceived and 
linked to activity (Penrose, 1959). 
Despite the differences between the three groups of theories, they overlap. These overlaps 
are often partial and not immediately obvious. For instance, RBV scholars consider Penrose 
(1959) as the foundation of their work (Barney, Ketchen Jr., & Wright, 2011) and refer to the 
Penrosean conceptualization of firms as bundles of resources with inherent value generating 
potential (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984). Similarly, DC scholars acknowledge Penrose’s work but fa-
vor Nelson and Winter’s (1982b) routine and capability based explanations over mental repre-
sentations when explaining firm behavior (cf. Teece et al., 1997). But Nelson and Winter’s 
work is associated with evolutionary economics, and Penrose’s theory is a position against evo-
lutionary views of the firm (Rathe & Witt, 2001, see also Penrose, 1952). Relatedly, while 
Penrose (1959) is considered foundational for the RBV and DC streams, Penrose herself con-
sidered resources as peripheral. To her, what is important is the productive services resources 
can render and how managerial ability and mental representations determine the set of these 
productive services available to a firm (Rathe & Witt, 2001). 
Given these partial links, it is not clear what resources actually are. It is also not clear how 
(or even if) actors can understand resources. Finally, there exists confusion around what re-
source alteration actually means. To make this dissertation’s focus explicit, an analytical frame-
work is proposed next. This framework departs from the aforementioned three resource aspects 
identified in the extant literature. 
3.2. The foundations of the analytical framework 
3.2.1. Value generation 
The assumptions developed here are a synthesis of extant theory. The most important assump-
tion is the value generation dimension of resources. Lachmann (1956) argues that resource ac-
tivities must be able to generate rents for a firm in order for that firm to exist. Conner (1991: 
134) refers to this ability as the “conditions for demand relevant to the product.” Simply put: 
there either needs to exist a market with buyers interested in what the firm offers, or the firm 
must be able to create such a market. Also, the firm’s cost of producing its value offering must 
be lower than what buyers are willing to pay. And while this value generating dimension is 
shaped by purposeful action (Penrose, 1952), nothing can compensate for a lack of a market 
viable set of resource activities (cf. Danneels, 2011). 
Cognitive theory has informed our micro-level understanding by highlighting behavioral bi-
ases (Zollo & Winter, 2002) and the role of mental representations (Danneels, 2011). Practice 
researchers have established that resource alteration takes place within a rule environment that 
both enables and restricts possible resource activities (Barley, 1986; Regnér, 2008). They have 
also shown that predispositions, which are unique to functional roles, determine how actors use 
a resource in a given moment and over time (Orlikowski, 2000), and that a firm’s imitation 
behavior is shaped by predispositions that go beyond economic concerns (Jonsson & Regnér, 
2009). There is a wide consensus within the literature that resource related work is a cross-
functional activity. Resources thus bind together an organization’s various functional areas 
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(Javidan, 1998) as these task environments engage in value generating activity through specific 
capabilities (cf. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Next, the three resource aspects are developed further into three resource dimensions that 
limit the resource alteration options available to a firm. 
3.2.2. Assets characteristics and mental representations thereof 
The distinction between asset characteristics and mental representations thereof is important 
because it alters the set of possible productive opportunities in two important ways.  
First, the distinction between asset characteristics and mental representations thereof shifts 
attention from the corresponding mapping between asset characteristic and productive oppor-
tunity, to the mapping between mental representation of asset characteristic and mental repre-
sentation of productive opportunity. Here, it does not matter what a particular asset character-
istic is. Instead, actors’ mental representations of these asset characteristics are emphasized. 
Second, the distinction between asset characteristics and mental representations thereof lim-
its the space of possible resource alterations to the mental representations of asset characteris-
tics. It does not matter what the asset characteristics actually are. Danneels (2011) demonstrates 
how mental representations of asset characteristics can lead to alteration choices that are non-
market viable.9 This is an important consideration because it suggests that actors cannot know 
the set of market viable resource alteration options. Therefore, their choices do not represent a 
selection among available options. Instead, decision makers have to rely on their mental repre-
sentations of these available resource alteration options. Consequently, the alteration options 
perceived to be available can include options that asset characteristics do not allow. Also, Pen-
rose’s (1959: 163) claim that “at any given time the known productive services inherent in a 
resource do not exhaust the full potential of the resource” is equivalent to stating that the options 
available to a firm’s decision makers are fewer than what asset characteristics allow. 
To conclude, the first important resource dimension is the mental representations of asset 
characteristics. It thus combines resource aspect one (asset characteristics) and resource aspect 
three (mental representations). 
3.2.3. Enacted rule environments and mental representations thereof 
Garud and Rappa (1994) show how beliefs are the result of a socially negotiated order and that 
these beliefs govern resource alteration choices. Specifically, they show that the direction of 
resource alteration choices are guided by actors’ mental representations of a future state of the 
regulatory context. Garud and Rappa show also that the institutional environment later deter-
mined the market viability of different cochlear implant technologies and limited asset combi-
nations to those the regulatory bodies ruled safe and efficacious.  
                                               
9 Note that non-market viable is what Danneels observed. I will not here entertain a discussion around his idea of 
inaccurate resource schemas since I disagree with the existence of a corresponding correct map onto which the 
schema can map. Resource schemas have, in my view, degrees of viability and not accuracy. The resource altera-
tion choices that managers at Smith Corona pursued, were all within the space of the possible resource alterations 
and all fulfilled the criterion of subjectively attributed value. 
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The limitations from the institutional environment to resource activities lie outside the 
boundary setting properties of asset characteristics. Garud and Rappa’s study shows how formal 
rules limit the possible activities a firm can competitively engage in. Many of these activities 
involve resources with the explicit purpose to comply with formal regulatory rules. Every for-
mal rule environment needs a corresponding enacted rule environment. Since regulatory texts 
within medical devices are purposively written in an inclusive style there are no clear directions 
to follow. Instead, firms are required by law to enact rules that correspond to regulations 
through establishing a quality management system.  
Where formal rules are open to interpretation, there will exist an interplay between cognition 
and practice (cf. Regnér, 2008). Therefore, it is important to consider localized enactment. For 
instance, ensuring safety requires human resource management (HRM) practitioners to secure 
competences and new product development (NPD) practitioners to establish documentation 
processes. These enactments are part of local realities with specific sets of activities and ar-
ranged entities that together make out the site of social coexistence. Resource alteration options 
are limited to those deemed feasible by the actors in various task environments.10 
The union of all localized enactments need to correspond with the formal rules. This corre-
spondence is, however, not a one-to-one mapping between well-defined rules and activities that 
meet these rules to a minimal satisfactory level. Because formal rules are locally enacted in 
idiosyncratic ways that necessitate coordination between task environments, the set of enacted 
rules is larger than the set of rules necessary for formal compliance. For instance, it is not 
enough that an actor considers only the formal rules; the actor must consider also how other 
actors in other task environments enact the same formal rules (e.g.: What does safety mean for 
others and how do they ensure it?). Members of a task environment are limited in their activities 
by these localized enactments of formal rules. These limitations to activities also involve activ-
ities related to asset characteristics with the potential of productive uses; thus they limit the 
number of possible resource alteration options available to the firm.  
To conclude, the second important resource dimension is the mental representations of en-
acted rule environments. It thus combines resource aspect two (coordinated resource activities) 
and resource aspect three (mental representations). 
3.2.4. Coordinated resource activities and mental representations thereof 
Actors attribute meaning to their resource related activities. This meaning differs between task 
environments. When several task environments coordinate around a resource activity (e.g., pur-
chasing of raw materials, using the firm’s brand in different ways, building the human capital 
of the firm etc.) they will attribute different meaning to that shared resource activity. As such, 
coordinated resource activities are built around divergent mental representations. Actors do not 
need to agree what is coordinated or why, they just need to consider the coordinated activity as 
possible. The number of possible ways actors can coordinate resource related activities limits 
the set of resource alteration options. 
                                               
10 While I only consider regulatory rules here, this argument applies to the enactment of other broader rules and 
norms specific to functional roles and task environments (cf. Jonsson & Regnér, 2009). 
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Any deviation from an existing state of coordinated resource activities necessitates a search 
for a new state. To reach this new state, members of each task environment must consider that 
state as feasible. This limits the set of resource alterations options to an intersection of what 
actors in various task environments consider possible. Here, actors in one task environment will 
either overestimate or underestimate the ability of actors in another task environment to perform 
in a coordinated resource activity. 
To conclude, the third important resource dimension is the mental representations of coor-
dinated resource activities between task environments. It thus combines resource aspect two 
(coordinated resource activites) and resource aspect three (mental representations). 
3.3. The space of resource alteration options available to a firm 
The discussion so far suggests that the space of possible coordinated resource activities, that is 
market viable, is limited by three resource aspects. Each of these contains a boundary independ-
ent of mental representation. For instance, asset characteristics limit resource related activities 
to those allowed by material properties. Enacted rule environments have a minimum require-
ment set by formal regulatory rules. Coordination is limited by the intersection of what each 
task environment is capable of. While these three determine the hard limit to the possible space 
within which a particular resource activity can take place, there exists an even smaller space 
that represents actors’ mental representations of each resource aspect. The mental representa-
tions are, in turn, shaped by both conscious and non-conscious mental activity (cf. Hodgkinson 
& Healey, 2011). Figure 2 tries to depict this static state of the resource alteration options avail-
able to a firm at a given moment in time. 
 
Figure 2. The resource alteration options available to a firm. 
In Figure 2, each of the three resource aspects mentioned above limits the space of available 
market viable resource activities. The first dimension, asset characteristics, limits the space to 
a bundle of asset characteristics under the control of the firm, and the mental representations of 
these asset characteristics. The second dimension, enacted rule environments, limits the space 
to those activities that are necessary to comply with formal rules, and localized mental repre-
sentations thereof. The third, coordinated resource activities, limits the space to the ways re-
source related activities can be coordinated between task environments, and the mental repre-
sentations thereof. The three black lines within the larger grey triangle demark the hard limits 
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of possible coordinated resource activities. The smaller grey triangles demark the mental rep-
resentations thereof. In the intersection of these small grey triangles, there is a black triangle. 
This black triangle represents the resource alteration options available to the firm. Here, actors 
from various task environments agree that the resource activity can take place. 
A resource in this framework is not a given entity but rather a relational totality that enables 
product outputs generating rents above their costs. Resources are part of, and outcomes of, a 
social accomplishment. This means that everything that enables the combination of inputs into 
product outputs are part of a resource totality. For instance, while a CAD software may be a 
resource in the design of a car, the exchange of the product output, i.e., the car, does not depend 
on the CAD software. Instead, the resource nature of the CAD software lies in the coordination 
it enables (e.g., sharing *.cad file across developers and manufacturers and the compliance to 
regulatory rules by allowing for low cost tests and traceability during development). 
Next, the method is described. 
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4. Method 
Chapter 4 first introduces the research context and the case company. Then, data collection and 
data analysis is described followed by reflections on research quality. This method chapter is 
descriptive and written as a supplement to the method sections in the appended papers. The 
final part of this chapter is a personal account of the research journey. 
4.1. Getinge AB and the medical device industry 
The information below is based on data from the 2012 annual report. 
4.1.1. The case company 
Getinge AB is a multinational corporation active within the areas of surgery, intensive care, 
infection control, and care ergonomics. It markets its products to healthcare and pharmaceutical 
customers and employs 14’919 people spread over 40 countries. Markets are geographically 
distributed with North America accounting for 32 per cent of sales, Western Europe for 37 
percent of sales, and emerging markets for 31 percent of sales.  
The company is organized into three business areas. The first business area, Infection Control 
(Getinge), employs 3’118 people. Its solutions are aimed at prevention and control of infections 
in healthcare and medical care. Its sales amount to MSEK 5’170 of an estimated market size of 
approximately MSEK 13’000. It offers solutions to the pharmaceutical industries and laborato-
ries. Finally, it offers complementary IT based solutions. The solutions offered can be divided 
into two product areas: 1) disinfection, with washer and flusher disinfectors, and 2) sterilization, 
with sterilization equipment, IT-systems, and loading equipment. 
The second business area, Extended Care (ArjoHuntleigh), employs 5’457 people. It markets 
solutions to the hospital, healthcare, home nursing, and elderly care markets and had MSEK 
5’990 in sales of an estimated market size of approximately MSEK 43’000. The product range 
can be divided into four product areas: 1) patient handling, with shower baths, as well as lifts 
and transfer equipment, 2) medical beds, including hospital beds, stretchers, and couches, 3) 
therapy and prevention, focused on prevention of pressure ulcers and deep vein blood clots, and 
4) diagnostics, with monitors for prenatal care. 
The third business area, Medical Systems (Maquet), employs 6’344 people. It offers a wide 
range of products and services to the hospital market and has MSEK 13'089 in sales of an esti-
mated market size of approximately MSEK 37’000. The product range can be divided into three 
product areas: 1) surgical workplaces, with surgical tables and lights, operating room theatres, 
and ceiling service units, 2) cardiovascular, with heart-lung machines, instruments and equip-
ment for cardiac surgery, vascular surgery, and cardiac assist, and 3) critical care, with ventila-
tors and anesthesia equipment. 
4.1.2. Medical devices and regulations 
Regulatory texts provide an inclusive definition of medical devices. This is true both in the 
European Union (EU) and the U.S.  
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Within the EU, the definition of a medical device can be found in the Medical Devices Di-
rective 93/42/EEC (EU, 1993): 
“medical device” means any instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other ar-
ticle, whether used alone or in combination, including the software necessary for its 
proper application intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for 
the purpose of: 
- Diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease, 
- Diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or 
handicap, 
- Investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological 
process, 
- Control of conception, and 
- Which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by 
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may be assisted 
in its function by such means; (EU, 2007). 
The U.S. based Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) offers a similar definition: 
"an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro rea-
gent, or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory 
which is: 
- recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmaco-
poeia, or any supplement to them, 
- intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or 
- intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other ani-
mals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemi-
cal action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not de-
pendent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary in-
tended purposes." 
Medical devices are classified either as Class I, IIa/b or III in the EU, or I, II and III in the 
US (Ogrodnik, 2012). Class I devices are those that carry low to moderate risk to safety, Class 
II carry moderate to high risk, and Class III are high risk and high impact devices in terms of 
patient health and safety. Some of Getinge AB’s offerings are also classed as a medical device 
through amendments. For instance, devices to be used for disinfecting other medical devices 
are either Class IIa or Class IIb devices (Annex IX, Rule 15, EU, 2007). 
The class determines what regulations apply, and the degree of regulatory control increases 
with each class level. The FDA impacts both the innovation outcome and the innovation process 
through four main statutes: 1) Premarket Notification (known as the 510(k)), 2) Premarket Ap-
proval (PMA), 3) Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), and 4) Quality System Regulation 
(QSR). Table 2 provides an overview of each together with the stated purpose and examples of 
impact on innovation outcomes and the innovation process. 
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Table 2. Overview of the four main regulatory statutes and examples of their impact on 
medical device development. 
 Purpose Outcome impact (e.g.,) Process impact (e.g.,) 
510(k) To demonstrate that the device 
is substantially equivalent to 
an approved device in terms of 
safety and efficacy. 
Innovation limited to being 
equivalent with pre-existing 
solutions. 
Form submittal 90 days prior 
to marketing. 
Provide evidence of substantial 
equivalency claims. 
PMA To demonstrate that the medi-
cal device is safe and effective 
for its intended use. 
Deterrent to more radical 
efforts due to increased un-
certainty and resource de-
mands. 
Produce scientific evidence of 
efficacy and safety through 
nonclinical and clinical investi-
gations. 
Provide data of quality control 
used during production. 
IDE Lists procedures for the con-
duct of clinical studies. 
N/A Details process steps of how to 
establish evidence of efficacy 
and safety. 
QSR To ensure that manufacturers 
abide to statutes ensuring prod-
uct safety and efficacy. 
Outcomes limited by the re-
quirements and specifica-
tions in place. 
Guidelines for PMA reviews in 
terms of what documentation 
and procedures are necessary. 
The four main statutes impact NPD to varying extents. For instance, a 510(k) demands little 
in additional resources to satisfy requirements to evidence claims of substantial equivalency 
(i.e., that product A is equivalent to B). An IDE and the subsequent PMA approval is far costlier. 
Note that these requirements often necessitate managing an overlap amongst several domains 
of knowledge (e.g., engineering, medicine, health care, and quality assurance). Successful out-
comes are thus particularly reliant on cross-functional collaboration. 
4.2. The Getinge AB studies 
The appended papers build on three empirical studies (A-C) conducted at Getinge AB as sum-
marized in Table 3. Each study is described below. 
Table 3. The three Getinge AB studies underlying the four appended papers. 
 A: Innovation at Get-
inge Skärhamn AB 
B: The next climb at 
Getinge AB/IC 
C: Regulation at Get-
inge IC 
Period 2011Q3 – 2014Q1 2011Q4 – 2016Q2 2013Q3 – 2015Q1  
Unit of obser-
vation 
Technology innovation 
process 
Resource alteration work Technology innovation 
process 
Level of analy-
sis 
Firm Functional area / practice Functional area 
Data collec-
tion 
Insider/Outsider, inter-
views, and document 
studies 
Field work, observations, 
interviews, dialogue, and 
archival studies 
Insider/Outsider, inter-
views, and document 
studies 
Appended pub-
lication(s) 
Paper Ia Papers III & IV  Paper II 
a Altmann and Engberg (2015) also uses data collected during study A. 
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The text below focuses on the studies. Paper specific method discussion are available in the 
appended papers. Here, I: (1) provide a context for the resulting papers, (2) clarify evolving 
onto-epistemological considerations, and (3) detail my role in co-authored papers. 
4.2.1. Study A: Innovation at Getinge Skärhamn AB 
Between 2001–2011, Getinge AB experienced a period of high growth. Annual growth rates 
for sales were 12,1% and for profits 17,4%. Due to a rapid increase in size (from ~900 employ-
ees to 15,000 over the past 20 years until 2015), concerns grew around the company’s ability 
to maintain its ability to innovate. In 2011, Getinge AB and Halmstad University launched a 
project called “Strategic Human Resource Management for Increased Entrepreneurship and In-
novation Performance.” The project aimed to “increase the understanding on how to maintain 
the company values, the entrepreneurial orientation, employee engagement and innovative per-
formance while growing and developing the business” (project application). 
I joined this project together with Robert Enberg. Robert was a Getinge native. He started 
working as a project manager with mechanical design in 2006. Since then, he has worked as an 
R&D project manager with process related questions, part of which involves regulatory com-
pliance for NPD. Our preliminary work was guided by a recent organization-wide internal sur-
vey which showed that the stated innovative climate and actual innovation output did not cor-
relate. Together with a senior executive, Robert and I identified two sites for our initial inves-
tigations. One site had a high reported innovative climate and a low innovation output. The 
other scored high on both innovative climate and innovation output. 
Study A involved interviews at two sites. Our findings revealed that the discrepancy between 
the self-reported innovative climate and the launch of new products was, to a significant degree, 
explained by development staff focusing on minor product improvements following a series of 
major product launches. This was a dull finding. Therefore, we focused on the site scoring high 
on both innovative climate and innovation output, Getinge Skärhamn AB. At this site, we con-
ducted nine semi-structured interviews during late 2011, each lasting between 30 minutes and 
two hours (see Paper I for details). 
At Getinge Skärhamn AB, Robert and I collected data on three medical device innovations. 
We initially focused on how managers from different hierarchical levels and functional areas 
perceived the link between product developers, a part of the firm’s human resources, and the 
technology innovation process and the resulting product outputs. This resulted in a publication 
on the impact of uncertainty on how managers frame product developers as a human resource. 
(Altmann & Engberg, 2015). 
In one of our conversations, Robert mentioned that the three innovation projects were all 
launched on emerging markets and that product developers and marketing managers had to alter 
their views on what constituted a successful product in order to succeed in their market entry. 
We focused our investigation on these development choices and how beliefs around what con-
stitutes a successful product changed over time. Following a submission, our reviewers asked 
us to further developed ideas around the transferability of different knowledge types. This en-
couraged us to consider the understanding of resource characteristics as part of resource alter-
ation choices. 
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The analysis was iterative and a joint effort. My main role in Study A was to use the data 
from the interviews (Robert was the main interviewee) to prepare the manuscript for Paper I. 
Robert’s main role was to review my interpretation and provide clarification and additional 
details. This setup, where the outsider uses insider knowledge to inform data interpretation, has 
been used within the context of technology development (cf. Elmquist, 2007). It allows for 
close proximity to data without being too costly on researcher time and without requiring in-
depth context knowledge on part of the outsider (cf. Balogun, Beech, & Johnson, 2015). 
4.2.2. Study B: The next climb 
As the company experienced its first growth related decline between 2008–2010, Getinge ex-
ecutives identified several permanent industry changes and began preparations for a new cor-
porate strategy. The draft strategy, named The Next Climb, was distributed to top executives in 
2012 by Johan Malmquist (the then CEO of Getinge AB). 
In February 2013, I was hired as a strategy coordinator by Magnus Lundbäck, the then ex-
ecutive vice president of human resources and sustainability. I was to aid in strategy work with 
a specific focus on Infection Control and to facilitate the alignment between the NPD and HRM 
functional area strategies. Before entering the field, I accessed internal documents and had par-
ticipated in company gatherings (cf. Paper IV). Robert and I also conducted interviews prior to 
and during Study B. Thus, I had a basic understanding of the company and the industry contexts. 
This understanding informed my observations of ongoing strategy work. As strategy work pro-
gressed, I began focusing on the delay in strategy implementation. I noticed that divergent un-
derstandings might account for some part of the delay. Over time, Study B focused on why 
resource understandings differed and how these differences mattered. 
At first, I focused on perceptions and interpretations of the strategy itself (more specifically 
its content) and did not actively consider the resource alteration process per se. By 2013Q3, I 
noted that contestation emerged over the feasible use of product developers. This observation 
further enhanced my focus on matters cognitive. For instance, one field note contained the fol-
lowing remark: “do contradictory views on development staff trigger framing contests?” The 
salience of this observation was confirmed by a reviewer. (S)he suggested that, given my access 
to granular data, I should not focus on cognitive frames related to environmental changes, but 
instead turn my attention inward and view the organization as a dynamic environment where 
framing contests emerge and get resolved (or not).  
Based on reviewer input, I shifted attention toward the firm’s internal environment and how 
functional area members interpreted this environment with relation to product developers as a 
resource. Following a submission and a first revision attempt, I split the manuscript into two 
(Paper III and Paper IV). While Paper III is published, Paper IV is still in development. 
4.2.3. Study C: Regulation at Getinge 
Between 2009 and 2013, FDA investigators conducted 10 inspections across three Maquet fa-
cilities. They uncovered violations of the Quality Systems (QS) regulation, the Medical Device 
Reporting (MDR) regulation, and the Correction and Removal (CR) regulation. This caused 
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significant problems for Maquet and Getinge AB. Between 2009 and 2014, it recalled 45 Ma-
quet-manufactured products and the Consent Decree, approved in 2015, has incurred costs re-
lated to quality improvement activities totaling MSEK 1’495. 
While the FDA’s mission is to secure patient safety, it also seeks to promote innovation that 
can benefit human health and wellbeing. Despite this dual purpose, regulation within the med-
ical devices context is often considered a barrier to innovation. Robert, however, believed this 
preconception to be false. He and others within the industry attribute barriers to what they call 
the ‘regulatory ghost.’ The word ghost is suitable for two reasons: (1) firms are often fearful of 
regulation due to its associated costs and risks, and (2) these fears are baseless because most of 
the barriers people complain about actually do not exist as formal regulatory requirements. A 
literature review revealed that existing research on regulation as a barrier relied on perceptual 
measures. Additionally, these studies had all found that the negative impact of regulation on 
innovation diminished over time while the regulatory statutes remained the same (cf. Paper II). 
Study C is similar to Study A in terms of method. One difference is that Study C relied more 
on Robert’s own work where he supplemented his experiences with nine interviews represent-
ing functional roles such as quality assurance, NPD, and FDA investigators. We then analyzed 
the transcripts and compared statements across functionally distinct roles and with formal stat-
utes. We sought accounts that diverged, i.e., where one statement connected an activity to a 
regulatory barrier whereas another did not consider the same activity as a regulatory barrier or 
where statements did not have a corresponding regulatory statute. Paper II presents our results. 
4.3. Epistemology and longitudinal field immersion 
This part discusses prolonged data proximity and the knowledge this proximity grants access 
to. The text is organized into three parts. The first two parts discuss methods and ontology. The 
third part presents reflections on research quality. 
4.3.1. Whereof one speaks, one attributes meaning 
Longitudinal field engagement allows a researcher to build a relationship with the respondents 
in a specific site. This is important when the aim is to study cognition in a specific context and 
how cognition shapes ongoing action and interaction (cf. Kaplan, 2008b). Actors reveal their 
experiences in what they say and through how they act. Proximity is necessary to discover who 
practitioners think they are, what they think they are doing, and to what end they are doing it. 
During Study A and C, Robert and I sought actors’ interpretations of experienced resource 
activities. If one assumes that actors form mental representations of their activities, then one 
way to access data is to ask people about their experiences. However, this necessitates that:  
(1) that actors can and are willing to articulate their mental representations, 
(2) the researcher asks meaningful questions to access meaningful mental representations, 
i.e., those that reflect a reality of interest as opposed a learning of the researcher, and 
(3) that the researcher can interpret answers in a meaningful way.  
The first point necessitates that respondents are willing to discuss their mental representations 
in honest ways. The second and third points reflect the importance of deep contextual 
knowledge without which it becomes difficult to understand what respondents are discussing. 
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My initial lack of knowledge about both the medical devices industry in general, and Getinge 
AB in particular, means that it is unlikely that I could ask suitable questions and interpret the 
answers in a usable way. This issue is mitigated by Robert’s contextual knowledge. Robert can 
be considered able to ask relevant questions about specific projects and learnings and interpret 
answers meaningfully, i.e., criterion (2), in ways I could not. 
It is more difficult to establish that actors were conscious about their mental representations 
and were willing to share these, i.e., criterion (1). But this is a commonly adopted onto-episte-
mological stance when conducting fine-grained investigations of cognition, i.e., researchers 
here assume that actors know and are mindful of what they know (cf. Kaplan, 2008a, 2008b; 
Danneels, 2011). 
4.3.2. Whereof one is silent, one cannot necessarily speak 
It can be problematic to assume that practitioners’ mental representations are available for con-
scious recall (Chia & MacKay, 2007; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Paper I shows that willing 
participants may not be able to communicate various asset characteristics of resources that are 
part of internalized practices even when asked to do so. An inability to articulate habitual ac-
tivities is a central consideration when researchers assume that activity is rooted in internalized 
practices. It is a central consideration also when researchers assume that the mind operates in a 
dual process fashion (cf. Kahneman, 2011; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). 
Regardless of theory and ontology, the aim of longitudinal field immersion is to provide 
accounts of localized realities. These descriptions benefit from both accessing data on actors’ 
attributed meaning to phenomena and by showing how actors bring “forth objects or phenom-
ena such as the strategy document and ‘markets’/environment” (Samra-Fredericks, 2015: 479). 
As the latter is often unarticulated, accessing these data require proximity to everyday activity. 
In Papers I–II, Robert and I relied mainly on interviews for data. Similarly, data collected in 
Paper III is also possible to account for in writing. By contrast, Paper IV moves beyond articu-
lated data in an attempt to capture habitual tendencies and taken for granted assumptions that 
actors are not conscious of. These are things people know so well that they literally cannot talk 
about them as long as they take them for granted. Here, what is not said can matter as much as 
that which is said. To access this type of data it is beneficial to have knowledge of local expec-
tancies and to have participated in the field. 
An additional reason not to rely solely on articulated data is that accounts of spoken or writ-
ten meaning is not suitable when studying practical action and practical reasoning (cf. Schatzki, 
Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001). Rawls (2008: 716) argues that “details of practices are 
not recoverable from accounts.” For instance, records of activity and questions posed during 
interviews are a poorly suited to access knowledge about a phenomena of interest. Rawls further 
argues that these accounts often “reflect accountability practices and not instances of events of 
actions” (p. 716). 
From a practice approach, understanding is primarily experienced. Practitioners do not have 
resource schemas (i.e., mental representations), they have schemata of resource actions (cf. 
Chia & MacKay, 2007). Often, the practices and activities that form such schemata of resource 
action are quite mundane and not easy to articulate by the actors who have internalized them 
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and may even be unaware of them. Similarly, recent work in cognition suggests that experiential 
learning underlies thinking that is “unavailable to conscious awareness” (Sadler-Smith, 2009).  
Aiming to account for events in the world, such as resource alteration, necessitates close 
access to data on what practitioners actually do in situ during strategizing episodes where re-
source alteration related choices are made (cf. Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2008). Schatzki 
(2005: 479) refers to such a micro-level approach to longitudinal field studies as adopting a 
“site ontology.” This approach views resource alteration as an ongoing socially situated accom-
plishment where practitioners’ engage in practical reasoning (Samra-Fredericks, 2015), where 
it is important to look at what people are actually doing as they do what they do, and to under-
stand why these actions make sense to them (Samra-Fredericks, 2015). Personal field experi-
ence is one such way to access data on these site-specific events. 
4.3.3. Capturing and reporting on the habitual and the mindful 
In the appended papers, my understanding of the site was derived either from my field engage-
ment (Papers III–IV) or through discussions informed by Robert’s experiences (Papers I–II). 
Analysis of the observed data related to the actual doing and how that doing was imbued with 
meaning as the doing unfolded. For example, in Paper IV, I gathered data from a strategy meet-
ing on how actors used SWOT and PEST analyses to create an understanding of the organiza-
tions resources and how this sense emerged in the dialogue among the meeting participants. 
Here, I was equally keen to capture both what was said, and what was not said as both reveal 
predisposed dispositions (cf. Paper IV). 
Note how the word ‘schema’ can represent mindful mental activity as well as discernable 
and patterned action that is not only mindful but in part habitual (cf. Chia & MacKay, 2007; 
Feldman, 2004; Feldman & Worline, 2011). Since actors are embedded in idiosyncratic practice 
sets, what they experience is necessarily pluralistic (Golsorkhi et al., 2015). The extant cogni-
tive literature acknowledges pluralism in interpretation and attributes it to bounded rationality 
and/or scripts. There exist also research on the affective components that ‘tag’ experiences (e.g., 
Sinclair, Sadler-Smith, & Hodgkinson, 2009). In contrast, pluralism in the practice sense exists 
even if actors are perfectly rational due to differences in the fields of practice that the practi-
tioners are embedded in. 
To study pluralistic meanings as carried by fields of practice necessitates that: (a) the re-
searcher is able to discern the mundane patterned activities that actors cannot articulate, and (b) 
it is possible to show how such activities predispose actors toward certain choices—ideally 
those that matter for firm outcomes (cf. Lynch, 2001; Samra-Fredericks, 2015).  
As aforementioned, a degree of contextual knowledge is necessary to discern mundane pat-
terns that actors cannot articulate, i.e., to satisfy (a). This is both time consuming (Samra-Fred-
ericks, 2015) and “it requires an approach that goes beyond talking to or observing strategists: 
to being with them. This implies co-inhabitation of a set of meanings and an exploration of 
intended an unintended, conscious and unconscious actions and consequences” (Balogun et al., 
2015: 451, original emphasis). So, while field immersion is necessary for accessing the habitual, 
it is not without difficulty. 
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I found it difficult to know when, or if, I could claim to understand the local context (not to 
mention provide proof of my claims). As Rawls (2008) argues, one cannot simply provide in-
terview statements verbatim or reports of observations. To the best of my knowledge, the way 
to report these data is by means of reaching social agreement. This social agreement emerges 
during the reviewing process and shapes what is counted as acceptable evidence.  
In addition to there not existing a convention on how to report these data, there is also a 
difficulty associated with the risk of the researcher internalizing the very mundane activities 
(and taking them for granted) that he/she was after describing in the first place. Exactly, how 
one knows when that ‘sweet spot’ between becoming aware of site specific practice sets and 
internalizing these is difficult to tell. But it is necessary to conduct research after one can be-
come aware of site specific practices but before they are internalized (cf. Golsorkhi et al., 2015). 
For me, to find the suitable level at which to tell and show the data from this ‘sweet spot’ was 
a significant challenge that took several iterations of writing and continuous dialogue with re-
search peers. Again, it seems that the ‘knowing of when the sweet spot is reached’ is the out-
come of a social verdict rather than an individual one. 
It is also a matter of rhetoric ability to show how activities predispose actors toward certain 
alteration choices, i.e., criterion (b). This necessitates that the researcher showcases the rigor 
behind data collection and analysis. Regrettably, there is very little guidance exactly how such 
reporting should be done given the lack of empirical papers based around such close involve-
ment (Balogun et al., 2015). My own experiences with Paper IV confirm the difficulty of es-
tablishing a clear connection between fields of practice and how these shape resource alteration 
choices. In the end, the connectivity mapping of practices and activities to particular resource 
schemas (cf. Paper IV) allowed me to showcase the necessary rigor to fulfil criterion important 
to mention that the connectivity map represents a static picture of what is in essence a dynamic 
phenomenon. Being able to show how everyday practices influence an ongoing phenomenon is 
challenging and prone to various biases. It is difficult to provide transparent accounts of, and 
demonstrate where, practice defined praxis to shape the actions and interactions of practitioners. 
This is especially challenging considering that respondents cannot articulate such connections 
during interviews, but only reveal it when they engage in everyday resource alteration work. 
For example, in Paper IV, vignettes are used to show how practices become strategic during 
strategy episodes and how they shape the way resource alteration unfolds. Such close access to 
data has implications for research quality. 
4.4. Research quality: Staying close from far away 
To collect and analyze data while being close to the site and respondents necessitate consider-
ation of the relationship between the researcher and the respondents. Cunliffe and Karuna-
nayake (2013) suggests four guiding considerations related to the relationship between the re-
searcher and the respondents:  
(1) Insider/Outsider-ness, i.e., how native the researcher is and how immersed the researcher 
is in the study setting,  
(2) Sameness/Difference, i.e., the similarity between the natives and the researcher,  
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(3) Engagement/Distance, i.e., how engaged the researcher is with the participants in their 
activities, and vice versa, and  
(4) Political activism/Active neutrality, i.e., the extent to which the researcher is involved in 
the agendas of various participants. 
These considerations are summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4. The relationship between me as a researcher and the respondents. 
 Paper I Paper II Paper III & IV 
Insider / 
Outsider 
I was outsider and my co-author had been a native for 
close to a decade 
16 months employment as 
strategy coordinator 
Sameness / 
Difference 
I have a BSc in NPD and a MSc in technology management (common degrees for 
employees there), Robert (native co-author) has a MSc in ME 
Engagement 
/ Distance 
The outsider was distanced and not involved in any di-
rect activities, the insider was actively working with 
topics under investigation 
Active coordination be-
tween NPD and HRM func-
tional area strategies 
Political ac-
tivism / Ac-
tive neutral-
ity 
Impact of foreclosure risk 
on respondent answers 
mitigated by triangulated 
data: NPD documents, 
the insider’s experiences, 
and reliance on historical 
projects 
Ongoing FDA investiga-
tion likely caused re-
spondents to shift blame 
(noted in data), mitigated 
by focus on semblance 
between stated and formal 
regulatory barriers 
My eagerness to deliver re-
sults mitigated by limited 
potential impact of work 
role and ongoing academic 
workshops and academic 
peer scrutiny 
Most of the items in Table 4 represent choices or states. For instance, a researcher is either 
similar or not, either an insider or an outsider, or either engaged or distant. But neutrality is 
particularly tricky. Neutrality is not inherently good or bad, but it represents an almost para-
doxical issue that is difficult but necessary to deal with.  
Getting close to respondents and getting them to open up and to understand their reality as 
they do, is necessary in order to gain an understanding of their local realities. But the same 
moment when access to these data is acquired, the ability of objective assessment is lost. This 
is particularly tricky when these data involve internalized practices due to two main reasons: 
(1) to grasp the internalization of these activities it is necessary to understand them deeply, but 
this deep understanding may lead to an inability to later recall them in mindful ways, and (2) 
the inability to distinguish between activities important for personal learning of a site and ac-
tivities that are part of the internalized aspect of the site. 
The concern with neutrality is most noticeable in Study B. I was very eager to prove myself 
and to deliver actionable results in my role as a strategy coordinator. I wanted to be part of the 
team working with strategy, a task I felt privileged to work with and felt that this work presented 
a great opportunity for my overall professional career. I also wanted to do well by the person 
who gave me the opportunity, i.e., the executive vice president for HRM who was a stake holder 
in the strategy process. While this permitted close access to data, it also negatively impacted 
my ability to maintaining an awareness of how this proximity shaped my analysis. Conse-
quently, my work suffered. Early manuscripts I prepared were described by a senior colleague 
as “very consultant like” and had little academic merit. 
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To overcome issues with proximity, I followed the advice of a senior academic colleague 
and did an analytical separation between strategy work and the resources involved in this work. 
My practical work had focused on the strategy process and treated resources as peripheral. In 
contrast, my academic work now treats resources as central. Doing so reduced concerns with 
neutrality since my work did not directly involve resources per se. 
Neutrality was also an important consideration when developing Papers I and II. In Paper I, 
the study site (Getinge Skärhamn AB) was under threat of foreclosure during the period of data 
collection and analysis. It is therefore plausible that respondents’ answers would portray a more 
positive image of the ongoing development work. This impact was mitigated by triangulated 
data. Documentation related to NPD was particularly helpful in confirming statements, as was 
Robert’s experiences with one of the development projects under investigation. Also, given that 
the projects under study were all developed in the late 1990s and early 2000, they had limited 
potential impact on anyone’s political agenda. Furthermore, the foreclosure was not based on 
innovation (which is what the study was investigating) but was motivated by scope and scale 
economies. Our study had no impact on these decisions. 
Paper II, however, is different in that it was conducted during an ongoing FDA investigation 
were individuals faced real risks. Robert was also actively working with quality assurance, i.e., 
regulation, and had a strong underlying assumption that regulation was not a formally traceable 
barrier. Here, I worked with data analysis and comparing statements from respondents with 
regulatory text in order to identify correspondence. This shifted attention away from politicking 
and potential ‘blame games’ toward what is stated in interviews and what exists in texts. We 
were therefore less interested in who was in the right and focused on documenting the existence 
of such discrepancies. 
Next, I move away from discussing the quality of the research process to discuss the quality 
of the research contributions. 
4.5. Reflections on quality of research contributions 
Locke, Golden-Biddle and Feldman (2008) discuss creating theory about what is possible as 
opposed to what is representational and/or predictive. Pursuing accounts of the possible makes 
sense when the nature of work is exploratory. While the cognitive literature and the practice 
literature are both well developed, fine-grained accounts of resource activity are scarce. In eval-
uating research quality that is based on exploratory and in-depth investigations, Golden-Biddle 
and Locke (1993) provide three criteria: authenticity, plausibility, and criticality. Each is con-
sidered next. 
Authenticity is about showing that the researcher has grasped the everyday experiences of 
the participants. Papers I–II were developed around Robert’s accounts as an organizational na-
tive. The authenticity criterion for Papers I and II is thus fulfilled. As for Papers III and IV, my 
own time as strategy coordinator came after an initial period getting acquainted with the indus-
try and the company. Although 16 months is not a long time, I believe it is adequate to grasp 
the situated experiences of organizational members. This is especially true in this case as Get-
inge AB did not provide a setting that felt foreign to me. Also, given my positive performance 
review as a strategy coordinator, I believe that I managed to grasp enough of the site to be able 
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to understand and report on the daily lives of those involved. Finally, when I presented my 
findings to the then vice president of human resources in early 2015, he stated that differential 
understandings of resources were “putting words on a problem [he] felt he had, but could not 
articulate.” Similarly, an R&D project manager expressed appreciation for what was considered 
a new perspective on why conflicts may emerge in organizations. Providing something that is 
practically relevant for practitioners is a sign of achieved authenticity of research contributions. 
Plausibility is about telling a story that makes sense and telling it while being transparent 
with data. As aforementioned, there is a very fine line between able to notice that which others 
take for granted (requiring immersion) and going too far thus internalizing it and taking it for 
granted yourself (requiring distance) (cf. Golsorkhi et al., 2015). When working with Robert, I 
would balance his immersion. When working alone, I relied heavily on research colleagues and 
reviewers. In both cases, the crafting of a story that makes sense takes place in a dialogue be-
tween academics. It is this dialogue that I seek to capture in a manuscript. A constant interaction 
between peers is paramount to fulfilling the plausibility criterion. After all, the story has to 
make sense and be deemed transparent by someone else than the author. Plausibility was sought 
by constant interaction with, for instance, my supervisors and to a lesser extent by telling the 
basic idea to other academic colleagues to elicit responses. 
Criticality is the third and last criterion. It is evaluated based on the ability of the text to 
cause readers to question taken-for-granted assumptions. Paper III and Paper IV challenge the 
prevailing notion that resources are objects that managers can have more or less correct under-
standings of. Paper I challenges the conventional wisdom that technology innovation for emerg-
ing economies must rely on localized collaboration efforts. Finally, Paper II questions the pre-
vailing idea that regulation is a barrier for medical devices innovation. Each of these proposals 
have been validated to the extent that the ideas were either accepted for publication following 
peer review or made it into the late stage reviews in academic journals. 
4.6. The research journey 
To describe the research journey, I use editorial decisions and reviewer comments. I do this to 
show how I have developed as a researcher during the PhD process without having to rely on 
retrospective sensemaking. The text below is not necessary to understand this dissertation’s 
findings. It does, however, provide insights into how these findings were developed. Readers 
primarily interested in the findings can jump directly to the next chapter.  
The text below is organized as follows: I first discuss general insights from my attempts of 
publishing and then detail the publication attempt of Paper IV. 
4.6.1. General insights from publishing attempts 
There is little that compares with the learning gained from an actual submission process. Using 
response letters and reviewer comments, I will here attempt to provide a relatively objective 
and contemporary account of a highly subjective process prone to retrospective sensemaking. I 
will also include my recollection of discussions with senior colleagues and supervisors. 
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On January 28, 2013, I submitted my first manuscript to Human Resource Management 
(0090-4848), an A* journal on the ABDC2016 list and a 4 on the ABS2015 list. In that manu-
script, I developed ‘a conceptual alignment model’ on how human resource practitioners ought 
to work to support innovation. In what mostly reads like a master program paper, I drew on 
practically every paper I had read about innovation and compared the papers with statements 
from 27 early interviews from Study B. It is hard to put words on this research output, which 
perhaps explains why the editorial letter only read: “desk reject.”  
I submitted a slightly updated version of the first paper to Creativity and Innovation Man-
agement (0963-1690), a C journal on the ABDC2016 list and a 2 on the ABS2015 list. The 
paper was desk rejected on April 19, 2013. This editor, however, managed to find the words to 
describe the manuscript. I learned that the paper was rather broad, that its theoretical contribu-
tion is far too limited given its more practical emphasis. This guided my future efforts toward 
emphasizing theory over its practical implications. 
I submitted two more papers during 2013. On June 8, 2013, I submitted a paper based on 
mix of data from both study A and Study B to the International Journal of Healthcare Technol-
ogy and Management (1368-2156), an unranked journal. This manuscript was my first co-au-
thored paper with a senior. I totally forgot about this paper as it took until December 3, 2014, 
before I received the following message from the editor: “the paper [has] been sent to more than 
20 referees who have declined to referee the paper and we have received only one report which 
considered the paper marginal.” That one (poor) reviewer commented that “The layout and style 
of the paper needs to be brought in line with normal guidelines of scientific papers.” This feed-
back was helpful because, at the time, I was frustrated about not being able to estimate how far 
away I was from being able to get a manuscript accepted for publication. 
The second manuscript submitted in 2013 was based on a study of the draft strategy that I 
accessed during my time as strategy coordinator. This manuscript was my second co-authored 
paper and was submitted to a special issue on business model innovation in the International 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management (1368-275X), a C journal on the 
ABDC2016 list. The paper went out to review and was rejected on November 13, 2013. Re-
viewers were mostly negative. However, this was the first time I had received a comment that 
can be considered positive. A reviewer wrote: “While I was excited after reading the abstract, 
I was disappointed after reading the paper.” The long list of ‘improvement suggestions’ that 
followed informed me about the things I did not know how to do yet. This included a failure to 
identify theoretical constructs in the literature review, a poor motivation for the case selection, 
emphasizing the wrong data, not clearly articulating the relevance, having a confusing structure, 
presenting a subjective account of data without any transparency by which my claims can be 
substantiated, and for a conclusion that is based around extensive “cherry picking.” At least I 
knew that I could write an exciting abstract. 
If 2013 was the year of desk rejects, then 2014 was all about learning how to write. I now 
attempted another submission of a manuscript based on Study B. I presented a manuscript at a 
conference in Corsica on April the 25th 2014. I got no questions following the presentation aside 
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from a single comment from a gentleman who commended my “attempt” to apply social con-
structionism on the study of strategy processes. Having no idea what that meant, I nodded and 
asked for a list of readings.  
A few weeks later I received a couple of books, sent to me by the audience member who I 
now realized was a respected author within the field. I learned a lot about the need to focus on 
a particular perspective when writing articles and got very good input on how to move forward 
with the paper. Most notably, I got confirmation on the idea that there is no ‘one single truth’ 
out there, an insight that I, being an engineer, was (and to a degree still am) very uncomfortable 
with. Regardless, I realized that throwing more boxes and arrows on the problem of reconciling 
different understandings would not work. 
The summer of 2014 was an interesting one. On March 12, 2014, Robert and I submitted a 
manuscript based on study A to R&D management, an A journal on the ABDC list and a 3 on 
the ABS list (apparently, I am a slow learner when it comes to ambitious goals). We got a desk 
reject. This time it was motivated by a mismatch between method and research question. This 
was when I started viewing manuscripts not as combined parts, but as a whole where each 
section is a variation of the same overall story. Robert and I completely reworked that paper 
and submitted a new version to International Journal of Innovation Science on August the 8th 
2014. We picked an unranked journal hoping to get into review. On April 3, 2015, we got an 
accept without revision. While this was my first publication I did not enjoy it. It is utterly point-
less to get an accept since there is little learning. I thus aimed higher with future submissions. 
By May 30, 2014, I had revised a manuscript based on Study B and submitted it to Journal 
of Management and Organization (1833-3672), a B-ranked journal on the ABDC list. I first 
received a major revision where one of my reviewers did a phenomenal job providing me good 
constructive feedback on how to develop the manuscript forward. My first ‘real’ review expe-
rience could not have been any better. Here is a part taken from the review letter: 
“I believe that “cognitive framing contests” provide a great theoretical lens from 
which to understand organizational behavior and specifically the strategic dimen-
sions of organizational decision making. […] I can only encourage you to continue 
using that lens as I view that it theoretically powerful and ripe for contribution. 
Furthermore, I believe that your research context as well as the access you have in 
the organizational context (type of data) allow you to study how framing contests 
emerge and resolve themselves. Finally, please also allow me to complement you 
for your writing as I found your paper to be very clear and understandable.” (anon-
ymous reviewer) 
For a PhD student struggling with direction, these sentences were gold. Not only did I get hints 
on how to use cognition in my writing, I also learned that the data gathered suited the aim I had. 
Even if I did not realize it then, these review comments provided important clues in terms of 
the match between ontology, epistemology, and the particular question I was pursuing. 
Furthermore, the reviewer asked me to narrow the scope of the paper, suggested some alter-
native research questions based on the data access I had (e.g., to focus on the process by which 
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actors break from past dominant cognitive frames to arrive at new ones), and expressed con-
cerns over the transparency of my data. I was asked to focus on a particular topic and to rethink 
my contribution. I was asked also to not only argue why I did things by spouting academic 
jargon, but to instead clearly explain how I did what I did. Finally, I was told not to ask my 
readers to trust my observations and quotes, and instead urged to provide data tables and show-
case my coding process. I proceeded to ignore most of these inputs. Not because I did not want 
to include them, but because it was not until two years later I understood (better) what they 
meant and how to put them into writing. 
I completed my second revision and sent it in for another round of reviews. Although I got 
rejected, I also received another round of valuable feedback from that very same reviewer. 
Again, it is helpful to show excerpts from this letter. 
“the research question has gained a great deal of clarity as well as am aware that 
you have been much more transparent about the data and how you got it.” 
“[drop] all references to the role of environmental changes.” 
“It seems to me that you have three cognitive conflict processes [one being] capa-
bility conflict” 
“I would simply focus on as simple of a model as possible in this paper. Perhaps a 
typology of cognitive conflicts that leads to creation of framing contests regarding 
organizational strategy. […] This direction would require you to refocus the paper’s 
introduction and literature review on strategy development literature and conceptu-
alizing them as a framing contest. This would create a clear connection for your 
theory and data.” (anonymous reviewer) 
Here, I gained valuable insights into what I had improved and, more importantly, what remained 
to be improved. I learned about what I consider a major benefit of sending manuscripts to re-
views: it identifies your weaknesses and your strengths and challenges you to work with both.  
On June 2, 2014, Carmen Lee and I presented a paper at a conference. This was the first 
manuscript prepared based on data from a parallel study on raw materials at Höganäs AB, a 
metal powders solution provider (not included in this dissertation). Following our presentation, 
an audience member asked how our paper would help managers in their daily work. Having 
presented a theoretical paper that linked cognition, capabilities, and resources, I found the ques-
tion puzzling. My inability to answer spurred a debate among audience members around the 
nature of reality and what actually matters. One side of the debate argued that our model showed 
clearly that resources are only relevant when used regardless of ‘actual’ material properties. 
The other side argued that material properties exist regardless of what we know about them.  
This separation between relevant and actual was an interesting one and something I really 
enjoyed as an engineer. To consider that there exists an objective reality, but that this reality is 
irrelevant as it is not what guides our activities, was highly insightful. Asking whether or not 
resources had a relevant existence, as opposed to an objective one, depends solely on the subject 
engaging with material properties of the resource in value generating ways. Although I did not 
realize it then, this was the moment when I developed the understanding of resources I have 
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today. On the 18th of September 2014, we received an invitation to submit the paper to Journal 
of Management and Change (unranked). We submitted a paper on October 8, 2014, and on 
April 25, 2015, we received a conditional accept with a minor revision. The revised manuscript 
was submitted on May 20, 2015 and subsequently accepted for publication (cf. Altmann & Lee, 
2016). Due to the limited amount of constructive criticism, I did not learn much. 
The year 2015 was about raising the bar and becoming a better researcher. I had demon-
strated an ability to come up with interesting ideas, what was lacking was an ability to get these 
ideas down on paper. First out was a conference submission to the 2015 AOM Managerial and 
Organizational Cognition track’s special conference in Roskilde. I had reworked the manuscript 
from Study B based on the helpful reviews received during earlier publication attempts. This 
rework included cognitive causal mapping and efforts to be more transparent with both data 
and the method. I submitted this revised version on February 22, 2015, and got my two confer-
ence reviewers’ comments on March 24, 2015.  
Reviewer 1 commented that: “The introduction section is attractive to keep readers in the 
research. The theory section and the method sections are developed well. Interviews and obser-
vations are reported well.” Similarly, reviewer 2 commented that: “the paper is relevant and 
interesting.” I now knew that I could keep my readers interested beyond the abstract. However, 
both reviewers challenged me to make my contribution more explicit, and to work more with 
the data to tease out interesting contributions. Also, both reviewers challenged me to better tie 
together the different parts of the paper. In addition, there were two comments that changed the 
paper’s development. Reviewer 1 expressed concerns over whether or not my data supported 
the claim that “cognitive conflicts are caused by different cognitive structures of managers.” 
Reviewer 1 suggested that the problem may instead lie in how understanding emerged around 
the strategy following its distribution and challenged me to consider alternative explanations. 
On a similar note, reviewer 2 recommended me to also split the paper into two papers and focus 
more on the micro-dynamics. Overall the paper was well received. 
Another conference submission was made on February 23, 2015, based on study A. The 
manuscript was sent out to review and we received two reviews on May 3, 2015. One reviewer 
commented that the paper was “moderately interesting” and another that it was “really interest-
ing.” By now, I did not receive any major comments on structure or writing. The number of 
positives grew and included statements such as: “The method/approach is systematic, applied 
well to a discrete case study and produces logical generic 'recommendations'.” There was also 
a comment on the direction of the paper. This comment caused disagreement among me and 
my co-authors that eventually made to us pull the paper from review. 
In parallel, another attempt was made to publish the manuscript previously submitted to In-
ternational Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management (based on Study B). This 
time, two co-authors joined and offered to rewrite the paper and submit it to a special issue on 
business model innovation announced in the Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management, and 
Innovation (2299-7075), an unranked journal. The paper was submitted on February 24, 2015, 
and on June 22, 2015, we received a revise and resubmit. All three reviewers liked what they 
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considered to be an interesting idea but had issues with how the paper was structured and pre-
sented. However, due to a task disagreement between me and my co-authors, we decided to 
withdraw the submission on July 8, 2015. 
While these two early attempts in 2015 did not yield any favorable results, I gained a lot of 
confidence and became more certain about my opinions regarding article writing. It was also 
helpful because it prompted me to take a step back and reconsidered my role as a researcher 
and what I really wanted to work with. 
 In early 2015, I decided to take the opportunity to move to another academic environment 
and was enrolled as a PhD student at Chalmers University of Technology. I had earlier taken 
courses there and met with Sofia Börjesson and Maria Elmquist who had offered inputs on a 
course paper that I felt identified a major challenge I had to overcome moving forward, i.e., 
being able to actually write a paper as a whole rather than a collection of parts. At Chalmers, I 
found renewed focus and drive and extended my supervisor group. This change in academic 
environment enabled me to re-focus my previous efforts and to get some much needed help 
with article structuring. With my new main supervisor, Maria Elmquist, I worked a lot on how 
to structure arguments, how to build an article, and what ideas to include and where. This period 
proved invaluable for what followed. 
Results came shortly after. Together with Robert, we developed a new manuscript that even-
tually became Paper I. On April 20, 2015, we submitted it to Research Technology Management 
(0895-6308), an A journal on the ABDC2016 list and a 2 on the ABS2015 list. We received a 
conditional accept on July 18, 2015. The five reviewers seemed positive and the editor summa-
rized their input as: reviewers “mostly found the paper well structured, appropriately supported, 
and very readable. All in all, reviewers felt this was potentially a strong contribution.” One of 
my major weaknesses, the structure, had not only gotten better but had received favorable com-
ments. It seems Maria’s efforts paid off. 
However, not all comments were positive. The reviewers felt that the “thesis is a bit buried.” 
During the Paper I revision, I also learned how important rhetoric and argumentation is for 
article writing. The feedback from the editor and the reviewers was very helpful in learning 
how to write a convincing introduction that culminates in a central thesis, how language matters 
to bring together all the parts of a paper, and how to limit the amount of things I want to say to 
those supported by data. During this part of the revision I learned a lot from Maria on how to 
read and relate to revision letters, and how to transfer these insights into an improved manu-
script. On September 10, 2015, Robert and I submitted the revised version of the paper and got 
accepted on October 27, 2015. 
On May 9, 2015, Robert and I submitted a paper based on data from Study C to Research 
Technology Management. On May 11, 2015, we received an invitation to revise prior to review. 
The editor wrote: “While we believe that our readers are likely to find your topic timely and 
compelling, the article does not meet our needs in its current form. However, we are interested 
in your topic and would welcome the opportunity to evaluate a resubmission.” In the letter, the 
editor listed three major concerns to be addressed. First, data transparency was an issue. In 
contrast to the Paper I, this manuscript did not have a clearly visible artifact to follow. On the 
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contrary, Robert and I were trying to capture the regulatory ghost. His vague feeling that regu-
lation was not an objective barrier to medical device innovation but emergent in social action 
and interaction was admittedly hard to prove. A second concern raised by the editor was that 
the context of FDA was not generalizable. A third issue was that the managerial implications 
were not up to the expectations of the journal’s practitioner oriented target audience. On June 
19, 2015, I submitted the revised manuscript. Two days later I got a reject motivated as follows: 
“A single-case study—even, we think, a single-industry study—is simply inade-
quate to answer the questions you purport to ask, that is how regulation is perceived 
to affect innovation and what companies might do about it. […] It requires readers 
to accept without external evidence that the perceptions of knowledge workers in a 
single company in fact mirror those of the entire industry.” 
This rejection taught me how important it is to specify your level of analysis in the introduc-
tion. Regrettably, I had formulated an aim as follows: “the aim of this paper is to investigate 
why regulation is perceived as a barrier to technology innovation.” Worse yet, the text in the 
introduction discussed regulation at an industry level based on an attempt to address the concern 
with a lack of generalizability. I had written the introduction in a way that made a reader expect 
a multi-industry study with a large sample size. I revised the introduction and changed the aim 
to: “this paper investigates how well stated regulatory barriers coincide with formal regulatory 
barriers during the technology development process.” On June 22, 2015, we submitted the man-
uscript to the Journal of Technology Management & Innovation (0718-2724), a C journal on 
the ABDC2016 list. On October 10, 2015, we received an editorial decision letter with an accept 
but with a request for “an exhaustive revision of your bibliographic references.” With that com-
ment I decided that I would aim higher for my next publication attempt.  
The opportunity to submit to a better journal came with the “Strategy Processes and Practices: 
Dialogues and Intersections” special issue in Strategic Management Journal. As this process 
has been paramount to my development as a researcher, I discuss it under its own section. 
4.6.2. Developing Paper IV 
Since the Roskilde conference, I had also been involved in writing processes based on the 
Höganäs study. Here my co-author and co-supervisor Joakim Netz was responsible for the sub-
mission process. The first version of the article was developed for the NFF conference in Co-
penhagen between 12-14 of August, 2015, and a revised version following input from the NFF 
conference and additional literature studies and data analysis was presented on the SKM con-
ference in Bochum between 21-22 of September, 2015. In the process of preparing the manu-
script for these two conference papers, I had learned a lot from my co-author Joakim on how to 
relate and tie together the different parts of a paper from a theoretical standpoint.  
I applied what I had learned into a revised manuscript based on the earlier Study B paper 
presented in Roskilde. By more actively considering theory, I decided to focus on one of the 
possible ‘splits’ recommended to me by my AOM reviewers. I submitted that manuscript on 
the August 31, 2015, to Strategic Management Journal (0143-2095), an A* journal on the 
ABDC list and a 4* on the ABS2015 list. I was rather surprised to see that the article was sent 
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out for review given that it was prepared rather hastily (later I found out that 80% of the sub-
missions had been sent out for the first round of reviews). 
I also received an invite on November 17, 2015, to develop my Roskilde manuscript further 
for publication in a book chapter. This presented me with a conundrum. While I had a manu-
script in revision in Strategic Management Journal, I still did not have any concrete publications 
from what was a massive investment put into Study B. Essentially, I had spent years collecting 
and analyzing data only to receive rejects. I here went back to the Roskilde conference reviews 
and decided to develop a paper based on another possible ‘split.’ However, I decided to develop 
Paper III to mirror what came to be Paper IV because that idea at least passed the desk and since 
I was convinced I would get a reject. I did not. 
On December 6, 2015, I received the invite for a high risk major revision for Paper IV. My 
editor wrote that: while “the reviewers found your paper, and in particular the rich Getinge 
Group case analysis, insightful and interesting to read, there were also a number of major con-
cerns that came up in the review process.” Three major concerns were listed:  
(1) Theoretical framing. The paper was poorly framed and the literature engage-
ment was insufficient. A clear theoretical lens was necessary. 
(2) Empirical data. The paper did not provide enough details on methodological 
rigor and sufficiency of empirical evidence. Triangulation was suggested. 
(3) Novelty of contribution. The paper did not clearly state or make explicit a 
contribution. 
In total, I received five pages of comments and highly constructive feedback. At the time, I was 
exuberant about this opportunity. Now, almost two years later, my enthusiasm about still being 
in the review process has somewhat lessened. But the lessons learned are undeniable. If I had 
to provide an estimate, I would say that ~90% of my development as a researcher came during 
the revision of Paper IV. While the earlier stages had revealed many of the dots necessary for 
this development, it was this revision that made me finally able to connect these dots.  
Reviewer 1 stated that my “core proposition that managerial resource cognition will differ 
by department and therefore shape the development of dynamic capabilities is interesting” but 
that my case study did not demonstrate this well. In my attempt to move beyond the rather 
descriptive data presentation I had in the AOM conference paper version, I had now gone a few 
steps too far. Again, I did not manage my readers’ expectations well and had confused them 
with poor data presentation. Reviewer 1 challenged me to better engage with the literature. I 
was ok with this given how the submission did not even have a theory section (I had focused 
all my efforts on the data presentation and the analysis of the data). While reviewer 1 was crit-
ical, he/she still felt that the core proposition was interesting and that there was a chance to 
complement existing data using additional methods (mostly interviews) and by dropping my 
reliance on archival data. This was a big concern for me since text-based data was all I had on 
the CEO (one of the three ‘managerial’ resource schemas I followed). Reviewer 2 had some 
different ideas. 
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Reviewer 2 started by stating that: “the use of resource fungibility and managerial resource 
schemas as theoretical lenses are interesting. In organizational settings where the nature of re-
sources and their potential uses are contested, this is an informative lens. Secondly, the use of 
qualitative data provides a granular understanding of this process.” From this I took that I had 
finally managed to match the context with my theoretical interests, something I had struggled 
with previously. Reviewer 2 continued by stating that: a “lack of a theoretical lens, unclear 
writing and data analysis makes your paper difficult to understand or assess its import.” This 
was a bit of a personal setback since I felt that I had improved my writing over the past year. 
Also, I was challenged to more specifically show how and why I used certain data, and what 
the theoretical basis was for including each datum. The rest of the comments were basically 
about the lack of clarity and how I confused my readers. I also received reading suggestions—
the work of Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007, 1993; see also Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997)—
to improve the clarity of my writing. 
By late December 2015, I found myself in a rather peculiar position. On the one hand I had 
a high risk major revision to deal with. On the other I had a book chapter to write. What made 
matters worse was that I had developed Paper III on the bet that I would receive a reject for 
Paper IV. I put things to the side for a while and focused on reading the literature suggested by 
my reviewers. I decided to focus Paper III on how capability reconfiguration triggers framing 
contests and conceptualized the organization as ‘an environment of uncertainty.’ In turn, Paper 
IV was focused on how divergent resource schemas are created during the resource alteration 
processes and how they in turn shape this very process.  
I first prepared Paper III so that I could practice the learnings from the Golden-Biddle and 
Locke texts. Specifically, I practiced how to weave a theorized storyline, how to shift between 
showing and telling data, and how I could use my data to convince. Paper III was submitted on 
February 5, 2016. On March 11, 2016, I got a conditional accept with minor changes. My focus 
now shifted to Paper IV. 
I needed to apply what I had learned during my PhD studies and from the very insightful and 
highly appreciated input on introduction framing I had received from Shiko Ben-Menahem, a 
visiting researcher from ETH Zürich. I shortened the manuscript for Paper IV substantially and 
made it more focused. I also triangulated the findings using multiple methods and sources of 
data. Having also addressed many suggestions for improvement from both Maria and Shiko, I 
submitted my revision on April 29, 2016.  
On June 20, 2016, I received another opportunity for a high risk major revision. The editor 
stated that: “Both reviewers commend you on the good work that you have done in the revi-
sion.” Alas, the letter did not stop there. While I had succeeded in addressing the first of the 
three previously highlighted concerns, i.e., theoretical framing (which I guess was low hanging 
fruit given how the first version lacked a theory chapter), reviewers continued to have concerns 
with the exact contribution (although reviewer 1 now stated that “you offer an interesting con-
tribution”) and the clarity of empirical evidence. In essence, the reviewers and the editor chal-
lenged me to move beyond simply stating that divergences existed to show how everyday prac-
tices create them and with what consequences. Then there were pages of minor concerns and 
issues as well. 
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Reviewer 2 was more critical but now offered more direct advice on how to develop the 
paper further. The advice that most impacted the ongoing revision were as follows: 
“I feel that you are documenting something that has already been well established. 
Where can you slice the data here? Can you show how particular practices (within 
functional areas) create or sustain divergences? Can you show through a practice 
based lens as to why contestation and framing fails after divergences are noticed?” 
“The relationship between resource cognition theory and practice based perspective 
is not clear. It might be better if you choose one or the other and from the paper I 
sense that you want to focus more on the practice based perspective.” 
I realized that I needed to substantially better my skills in practically every aspect of article 
writing in order to successfully complete the revision. I started by reading over 100 articles 
published in top journals, and the books by Johnson et al. (2007), Jarzabkowski (2005), Schatzki 
et al. (2001), and Golsorkhi et al. (2015). As my knowledge grew, I realized that my chosen 
theory streams cognition and practice were incommensurate. To get around this problem I de-
cided to adopt practice theory as the overall theoretical lens and argue that cognition is carried 
by fields of practice. This allowed me to focus on practices as carriers of meaning, but also as 
generative for divergences. At the same time, I could still keep the resource schemas, which 
both reviewers found interesting, by focusing on how they in turn shaped unfolding resource 
alteration activities. I was also recommended to drop all references to dynamic capabilities 
(which featured heavily in the revised version) as this confused the reader. So I did. 
While the ideas I worked with succeeded in convincing fellow researchers, I now faced an-
other major challenge: How could I empirically show that practices create divergences? I had 
previously prepared a manuscript on what constitutes a meaningful micro-level for organization 
studies where I drew on the literature in biochemistry and nonlinear chemical dynamics. Having 
faced great difficulty finding a suitable method to rely on, I once again turned my attention to 
the literature within biology and chemistry where I found an article describing connectivity 
mapping (cf. paper IV). While I was happy to find something that I felt could work to address 
reviewers’ concerns related to empirics, I was also worried because I was exploring uncharted 
ground. Discussions with senior colleagues helped ease some of these concerns. Björn Lantz 
told me that there was an obvious connection between how the connectivity mapping was ap-
plied in biomedicine and how it could be applied to my own work. Similarly, Maria showed 
great interest in the approach and urged me to continue working with it as it made the data 
mapping to theory quite clear. Shiko commented that the method seemed thorough. Finally, 
Robert was also impressed and felt that it made quite fuzzy concepts rather clear. With that, I 
had managed to generate interest from scholars doing both quantitative economic analysis and 
qualitative collaborative industry research, as well as received positive input from an industry 
practitioner. 
The possibility to test the connectivity mapping ideas with the Special Issue editors came 
with a workshop organized for those of us who had made it to the second round of review. The 
workshop was held in Berlin on September 21, 2016, and presented an opportunity to not only 
share work but receive feedback from all the editors. I presented the connectivity map and got 
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confirmation that it worked as a method to connect activities with resource schemas. I presented 
also the revised coding approach and got positive comments. Having secured the rigor and the 
empirical clarity (one of the two remaining concerns) I now turned my attention to the remain-
ing concern: contribution.  
In Berlin, I shared two comments by reviewer 2 on exploring how practices create diver-
gences and how these divergences mattered for resource alteration. Several editors agreed that 
these were interesting questions. I got further confirmation that this was a suitable focus by my 
corresponding editor who stated that the main reason for my revision opportunity was that he 
believed that I had the data to show how practices create resource schema divergences that lead 
to cognitive conflicts and the breakdown in resource alteration work. 
I rewrote the entire manuscript based on the Berlin input and iterated several versions with 
Maria who spent hours with me going through suggestions on how to structure the paper, helped 
me to sharpen the contributions, and generally contributed to making the text more convincing. 
I also sent out a late version to Eric Knight who offered some valuable final insights. I now felt 
hopeful for the first time. 
Hope did not help. On the 23rd of February, 2017, I received a “reject and resubmit.” The 
paper thus did not make it to the special issue but I was invited to submit to a regular issue 
where it will go out for a fourth round of review.  
As for the reviewer comments, the first reviewer was not happy with the way the paper’s 
direction was going: 
[M]y sense is that you missed an opportunity here. The previous version of your 
paper took a promising direction. To what extent functional differences shape the 
resource development process is a very interesting question which we are unable to 
answer yet. As I pointed out before there are several issues you have to address 
before you can make a contribution in this regard. But once these issues are dealt 
with you end up with a truly attractive paper.  
My sense is that you decided to take a different direction with the paper rather than 
addressing these issues. I would still like a more careful consideration of the exact 
role of the two functions you study to determine how much influence they have on 
the development of new resources. And I would also need further clarification on 
how you were able to study the development of new competences, considering your 
period of observation versus the time it takes to develop them. 
With what I know today, I would guess that reviewer 1 wishes me to draw more on the work of 
for instance Danneels (2002) and Floyd and Lane (2000) in how competences are developed 
within organizations in a product development context. Reviewer 2 had a different opinion: 
The authors have revised their manuscript to address many of the reviewers’ con-
cerns about the theoretical framework and methodology […]. I commend the au-
thors for their extensive revisions to reposition the manuscript. 
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So, while reviewer 1 did not like the extent and direction of the revision, reviewer 2 seemed to 
be more in favor of it. Reviewer 2 also noted several improvements to clarity, but he/she con-
tinued to raise concerns: 
I find this paper interesting in terms of its research question and the data collected 
through field research. It addresses an important question in the field of strategy. 
There are some paragraphs in the paper where the writing and analyses is creative 
(e.g. use of Lamb et al’s work for coding). However, lack of definition of key con-
cepts, identification of what a resource is and what resource schemas are being con-
sidered in this study (human resources versus organizational resources) and inte-
gration of concepts (e.g. keying and bridging) throughout the manuscript makes it 
difficult to understand the paper and its contributions. 
The irony of writing a dissertation on what resources and resource related phenomena actually 
are and then failing to clearly define them in my own manuscript is not lost on me.  
Going forward, I will have to make a choice between the two reviewers. This choice is also 
reflected in the options I was given related to being assigned a new editor. One option is Rich-
ard Whittington, which would suggest that I focus on addressing the concerns of reviewer 2. 
Another option is Steven Floyd, which would be preferable if I focus on competences and the 
comments of reviewer 1. Either way, much work remains. 
The next chapter presents a summary of the appended papers. 
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5. Summary of appended papers 
In this chapter, each of the four appended papers are briefly presented. The full versions are 
appended at the end of the dissertation. The papers are presented in the order that their under-
lying studies were completed.  
5.1. Paper I 
The purpose of Paper I is to propose home-based R&D focused on emerging market needs as 
an alternative to localized partnerships when developing frugal innovation in high-tech firms. 
On a theoretical level, Paper I shows that the perceived knowledge transferability shapes what 
strategy practitioners consider a suitable frugal innovation approach. 
The analysis of three development projects reveals that the assumed transferability of both 
technical knowledge and local market knowledge determines development trajectories. Paper I 
shows that when the transferability of local market knowledge was assumed low and the trans-
ferability of technical knowledge assumed high (i.e., difficult to understand the local market 
but easy to transfer technical knowledge to local market partners) practitioners chose to rely on 
local market presence. Following failure, practitioners concluded that the local market 
knowledge was more transferable than was the technical knowledge. They then chose to rely 
on home-based R&D. To succeed, the firm’s technical knowledge and market knowledge was 
combined to re-conceptualize the core product (sterilizer) as well as to question several long-
standing assumptions that led to the prior failures. 
By showing that practitioners do not necessarily include important asset characteristics in 
their resource alteration choices, Paper I highlights how the habitual and the mindful play a key 
role for resource understandings and resource alteration choices. 
5.2. Paper II 
The purpose of Paper II is to illustrate localized divergences between stated regulatory barriers 
(by organizational members) and formal regulatory barriers (those found in the FDA regulatory 
framework). The study is based on an insider-outsider research approach and investigates a 
recent burdensome regulatory inspection at Getinge Infection Control. 
Paper II identifies discrepancies between formal rules as stated in regulatory texts, and en-
acted rules as norms and behavioral expectations that emerge locally as formal rules are opera-
tionalized within the firm. The findings show that out of the eight stated barriers, only one 
corresponds to a formal requirement. 
Paper II shows also how different task environments within a functional area underlie dif-
ferent enactments of formal rules. Because of these differences, tensions emerge between pro-
fessional workgroups. These tensions are hard to resolve due to divergences between task en-
vironments. Members of one work group are also ill-informed about the task environment of 
another work group. Paper II suggests that actors attribute what they consider unfavorable ac-
tions of others to generalized role behaviors. For instance, quality assurance staff may view 
product developers as creative individuals who simply do not like rules and therefore actively 
work against rules. Similarly, product developers may view quality assurance staff as overly 
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bureaucratic. Paper II suggests that this role attribution is detrimental for engaging in the dia-
logue and collaborative work necessary to minimize the discrepancy between formal regulatory 
rules and enacted (and overly cumbersome) regulatory rules.  
5.3. Paper III 
The purpose of Paper III is to investigate how the resource alteration process is shaped by dif-
ferences in managerial beliefs related to what the organization is capable of and the nature of 
these capabilities. Paper III focuses on the process of: (1) how an existing capability is decon-
structed into its building blocks (e.g., resources), (2) how these building blocks are assembled 
into new capabilities, and (3) how (1) and (2) trigger attempts of framing contests. 
The analysis shows that functional area managers displayed reliance on both habitual think-
ing (specifically the reliance on past patterns of cross-functional interaction) as well as active 
thinking related to the identification of gaps, problems, and solutions. The findings show that 
functional area managers neither agree on the nature of past patterns of cross-functional inter-
action, nor the nature of resources as capability buildings blocks. The findings show also that 
when these disagreements become known, tensions emerge that can trigger framing contests. 
The findings show also that divergent resource understandings may not be readily apparent 
to actors. This is because schema-action outcomes are equifinal, i.e., the same action (e.g., a 
cross-functional resource exchange) can result from two divergent, even contradictory, resource 
understandings. Functional area members have no way of knowing that this is the case. It is 
only when the divergence manifests in alteration proposals that these actors find troublesome 
that they become aware of the divergences. 
Paper III shows that practitioners can have different, even contradictory, mental representa-
tions or resources underlying long existing coordinated activity. This is significant because it 
identifies the locus of shared/collective understandings to be activity and as opposed to mental 
representation. Paper III also points out that both mindful strategizing and alteration choices 
are bound by the task environment of practitioners. 
5.4. Paper IV 
Paper IV investigates the process of how new strategy commitments are resourced within an 
organization that is experiencing unambiguous changes in its competitive environment. Specif-
ically, it investigates how practices (within and between functional areas) create resource 
schema divergences as resource alteration unfolds. It then links these divergences to emerging 
cognitive conflicts, i.e., disagreements among practitioners pertaining to a particular task (cf. 
Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Floyd & Lane, 2000).  
The findings show how strategy practitioners draw both on different practices as well as the 
same practices differently during the resource alteration process. During early stages of re-
source assessment (where the resource properties are evaluated in relation to a new commit-
ment) practitioners draw on practices in ways distinct to their functional areas. These idiosyn-
crasies create resource schema divergences that, over time, escalate into cognitive conflicts.  
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Paper IV shows that an inability to solve these conflicts may hinder continued resource al-
teration work. This inability is linked to two types of practices. The first is the locus of divergent 
meaning, the second the target of emerging conflict. Paper IV shows also why these created 
divergences obstruct resource alteration. Although shared understanding is not necessary for a 
coordinated resource activity, Paper IV shows that settling on a new coordinated resource state 
can be difficult as proposed resource alterations make more or less sense to functional area 
practitioners depending on their task environments. Paper IV contributes here by showing that 
resource understandings are inextricably linked to how these resources are used in specific task 
environments. 
Following Table 7, which summarizes the appended papers, the next chapter analyzes and 
discusses the empirical observations of the appended papers. 
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6. Analytical discussion 
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend theory on how resource understandings and re-
source alteration unfold within and between a firm’s different task environments. This chapter 
discusses the empirical results. The discussion is organized under two headings, each corre-
sponding to one of the two research questions. It ends with an overall synthesis of the results.  
The motivation behind this structure is to analyze purpose from two different theoretical per-
spectives, i.e., cognitive theory and practice theory, and then to combine the two in order to 
develop this dissertation’s theoretical model. 
6.1. How task environment specific resource understandings 
shape resource alteration 
Danneels (2011) shows that the way managers understand their organizational resources, and 
the potential uses of these resources, determines the direction in which they alter them. He 
argues that when these understandings are incorrect, the success of resource alteration outcomes 
is far from certain. Based on his findings, Danneels advises managers to engage in activities 
that increase the accuracy of their resource schemas. 
Extending Danneels’ findings, this dissertation considers differences in mental representa-
tions between task environments (cf. Dougherty, 1992a). It is well known that different task 
environments matter for how an existing resource activity is altered (Zbaracki & Bergen, 2010; 
Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Regnér, 2003; Floyd & Lane, 2000) and that context matters for cog-
nition (Hutchins, 2010; Rocha, 2012). The studies in this dissertation add to our understanding 
of how task environment specific resource understandings shape resource alteration in several 
ways. Table 8 contains a summary of these findings. 
6.1.1. The habitual and the mindful, their configuration, and impact on 
resource alteration 
Hodgkinson and Healey (2011) argue that the literature has hitherto focused on the mindful and 
non-affective dimensions of resource alteration. This view on resource alteration choices as 
dispassionate and rational has led to what Hodgkinson and Healey (2011: 1503) refer to as “an 
impoverished portrayal of dynamic capabilities.” 
This dissertation’s findings draws attention on how the mindful interacts with the habitual 
during resource alteration to produce organizational outcomes (cf. Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; 
Salvato, 2009). The findings also provide insights into the cognitive context of activity config-
urations (cf. Regnér, 2008). Specifically, the three studies (A–C) revealed that the mindful and 
the habitual simultaneously shape resource related mental representations. Study B showed that 
actors are mindful of their own professional, organizational, and strategic contexts without nec-
essarily being mindful of the derived sense in these contexts. For instance, human resource 
practitioners attributed a decline in innovative ideas to a decline in the number of creative indi-
viduals. In contrast, product development practitioners attributed the same decline in ideas to a 
cumbersome innovation process. 
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The finding that the habitual and the mindful co-exist contrasts the conceptualization of 
shifts between the two modes of thinking (cf. Louis & Sutton, 1991). Instead, it confirms recent 
findings related to an actor’s simultaneous reliance on both the mindful and the habitual during 
the conduct of their activities (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). It adds 
also to Salvato’s (2009) account of how the mindful and the habitual underlie an evolutionary 
process of NPD capability renewal by showing how attempts of such a capability renewal can 
be contested across task environments due to divergences in resource related mental represen-
tations that emerge in the daily activity of strategy work. 
When taken together, the three studies (A–C) provide insights beyond exploring the rela-
tionship between the mindful and the habitual. They show also why actors derive habitual sense 
from the practices they mindfully draw on. For instance, Study A shows that actors did not 
initially consider the transferability of highly technical knowledge. Actors took various re-
source related activities for granted even though these activities proved necessary for adapting 
the technology to local market conditions. Because of their habitual tendencies, actors did not 
include certain asset characteristics into consideration in their resource alteration proposals. 
It is important to consider alternative explanations for the observed lack of consideration for 
technical knowledge transferability. One such alternative explanation is that decision makers 
purposefully limited the transfer of technical knowledge. This may be the case, for instance, 
when actors evaluate the risk of revealing proprietary technical expertise relative to the risk of 
market failure due to insufficient product quality. There exist at least two instances when this 
is a valid explanation: (1) when those in charge of transferring technical knowledge feel threat-
ened by those who receive it, and (2) when the transferred technical knowledge is considered 
part of a core competence of great competitive value. Neither applied in the reported case.  
The foreign market site was not threatening the existence of the home-based site. Addition-
ally, the quality concerns were not linked to any technical knowledge that actors considered as 
a source of competitive advantage. The observed shift toward home-based development is bet-
ter explained by managers becoming mindful of knowledge transferability, consequently alter-
ing their mental representations of resource properties and their uses. The transferability of 
technical knowledge was overlooked because the decision makers, who all had decade long 
experiences with technical product development, took technical knowledge for granted. And 
that which is taken for granted, cannot be part of mindful resource alteration decisions. In Study 
A, the limits of resource alteration options were primarily limited by asset characteristics and 
mental representations thereof. These mental representations predisposed actors to certain re-
source alteration choices. 
Asset characteristics and mental representations thereof account only for a part of the re-
source alteration choices made by decision makers in the three studies. Coordinated resource 
activities and mental representations thereof matter too. For instance, Study B shows how actors 
within different task environments viewed the existing resource related exchanges in different 
ways. HRM practitioners framed the existing state of coordinated resource activities as them 
supplying a specific type of product developers and nurturing a specific type of innovative cli-
mate, both to secure short term financial benefits. Product developers, in turn, believed that 
human resource managers supplied all their human capital needs. Both views made sense given 
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the coordinated resource activities prior to the strategy work investigated in Study B. These 
differing views did, however, predispose actors to task environment specific resource alteration 
proposals. Functional area managers for NPD, believing that all human resource needs can be 
supplied, developed strategies based on this assumption. 
Study C provides additional insights into how actors make resource alteration decisions 
based on a configuration of the mindful and the habitual. Study C shows how actors within one 
task environment expect actors from another task environment to behave in role specific ways. 
Actors developed these expectancies by attributing activities associated with regulatory com-
pliance to role specific character traits. For instance, quality assurance staff saw product devel-
opers as creative individuals who reject control. Consequently, quality assurance staff believed 
that product developers consider regulation as a barrier because of the associated controls.  En-
acted rule environments, and representations thereof, matter for how actors make sense of other 
task environments and their respective actors. And what actors know about what others are 
capable of in specific rule environments, shapes their resource alteration proposals. 
To conclude, task environment specific resource understandings shape resource alteration 
through the configuration of habitual and mindful resource related activities that underlie task 
environment specific resource understandings. Actors who are members of different task envi-
ronments are therefore predisposed to certain resource alteration choices. These predispositions 
depend in part on their mental representations of asset characteristics, coordinated resource ac-
tivities, and enacted rule environments; and in part on what actors can bring to consciousness 
as they develop resource alteration proposals. 
6.1.2. From shared mental representations to sharing elements of mental 
representations 
Tripsas and Gavetti’s (2000) study of Polaroid illustrates how considering both the habitual and 
the mindful extends existing theory. Their study shows that senior executives pursued renewal 
based on beliefs in an instant imaging business model, which discouraged development efforts 
aimed at digital imaging. In contrast, managers closer to the market argued for an increased 
emphasis on digital imaging. 
Considering only the mindful aspects of resource understandings, Tripsas and Gavetti argue 
that differences in industry signals predisposed managers in different task environments to dif-
ferent resource alteration choices. Hodgkinson and Healey (2011: 1504) argue that by logical 
extension “providing the two parties with the same information would have yielded consonant 
representations.” They then suggest an alternative interpretation and argue that environmental 
information triggers an affective response, which means that managers in different task envi-
ronments will draw different conclusions about the same data.  
On the basis of the three studies, this dissertation extends views focused only on the mindful 
(Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and the affective (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011) by suggesting that 
the task environment specific activity configuration—the habitual and the mindful resource re-
lated activities—underlie mental representations of resources and schemata of resource actions 
that predispose actors to certain resource alteration choices. This dissertation argues that the 
task environments themselves explain a low consonance in resource alteration proposals.  
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This dissertation’s findings confirm previous studies that show how actors cannot agree on 
resource alteration choices. However, it does not view this low consonance as a result of actors 
being members of different information interpretations systems (cf. Daft & Weick, 1984; Trip-
sas & Gavetti, 2000) or because they experience discomfort (cf. Hodkingson & Healey, 2011). 
Instead, this dissertation suggests that actors in different task environments cannot agree be-
cause their task environments underlie specific configurations of habitual and mindful resource 
activities. Consequently, actors have task environment specific resource understandings. This 
explains divergences both if we assume that actors are perfectly rational and devoid of emotion, 
as well as if we assume that actors are non-rational and affective.  
Contrary to ideas of shared understandings, this dissertation suggests that actors cannot view 
resources the same way and questions whether any amount or type of activity will lead to more 
accurate mental representations (cf. Danneels, 2011). Instead, the dissertation proposes that ac-
tors view a minimum of the same resource activities that are shared across task environments. 
Study B and C also contribute to a growing attention to social cognition, i.e., mental repre-
sentations about relationships and interactions between people throughout the organization (cf. 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). They do so by confirming that attributions are largely automatic. Ac-
tors can take for granted certain interactions and relationships between various task environ-
ments, and expect actors to act in functionally defined ways. Additionally, Study B and C pro-
vide insights into the set of available resource alteration choices available to firms operating in 
traditionally stable environments. Study C shows enacted rule environments correspond to per-
ceptions of both formal rules and the way other task environments enact their rule environ-
ments. Study B suggests that actors seek to economize resource activities when existing cross-
functional resource exchanges have remained stable for some time.  
To conclude, task environment specific resource understandings shape resource alteration, 
in part, through shared elements of resource understandings. Actors who are members of dif-
ferent task environments cannot share mental representations of resources. Rather than viewing 
certain things in the same way, they view a minimum of the same things. This limited number 
of resource related activities determines the consonance of all resource alteration proposals. 
6.2. How task environment specific resource alteration shapes 
resource understandings 
As resource alteration unfolds, actors’ resource understandings change. Here, resource activi-
ties underlie evolving resource understandings (Penrose, 1959) or simply just generates new 
possibilities for resource uses (Feldman, 2004). To this background, three specific aspects of 
the relationship between resource alteration and resource understandings are highlighted in Ta-
ble 9 and discussed below: (1) environmental feedback and how it impacts activity configura-
tions that underlie resource understandings, (2) sharing resource alteration proposals as a trigger 
for this feedback, and (3) how resource understandings are created. 
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6.2.1. The role of task environment feedback 
Task environment feedback alters the configuration of mindful and habitual resource activities. 
This argument is similar to that of how patterns of resource commitments emerge through trial 
and error learning (cf. Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2005). 
Study A shows how the realization that emerged around the transferability of technical 
knowledge and the transferability of local market knowledge resulted from learning. The pro-
cess unfolded in a way which is typical of logical incrementalism, i.e., that strategies unfold in 
a series of small decisions that are evaluated periodically where each decision is based on trial 
and error based learning (Quinn, 1978). Awareness around transferability was thus learned 
based on performance outcomes.  
However, this dissertation suggests that it is not necessarily a gap of resource related under-
standing that explains unsuccessful resource alteration outcomes. Study A shows that it is pre-
cisely because technical knowledge was obvious that it was not considered. Here, feedback 
enabled practitioners to bring to consciousness that which is taken for granted. In doing so, 
feedback can also enable actors to alter their mental representations of asset characteristics. 
Study A shows how Getinge Skärhamn AB practiced technical knowledge on a daily basis. It 
was thus a taken for granted part of the local reality akin to what Chia and MacKay (2007: 217) 
refer to as “habituated tendencies and internalized dispositions.” It was only when reports of 
quality concerns were made available that strategy practitioners actively considered the trans-
ferability of technical knowledge. Here, practitioners had to learn what they knew so well that 
they (literally) could not remember. 
Study B reveals another important aspect of feedback. In focusing on intra-organizational feed-
back between different task environments, Study B reveals how actors become aware of diver-
gences in mental representations during the sharing of resource alteration proposals. Again, by 
highlighting the mindful and the habitual, this dissertation suggests an alternative view on why 
resource alteration proposals may experience significant resistance in an organization. Here, 
resistance is not explained primarily by differences in thought worlds (cf. Dougherty, 1992a) 
or by power struggles and discomfort (cf. Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). 
While these aspects have merit, Study B highlights how actors in one task environment resist 
the resource alteration proposals of another task environment simply because these actors con-
sider the proposed resource alterations to be unfeasible.  
In all three studies, feedback opened up the possibility to alter the configuration of what 
actors were mindful of and what was habitual. However, Study C provides one additional in-
sight. Actors may notice signals that open up the possibility for habitual resource activit ies to 
become mindful without necessarily altering their configurations. For instance, in Study C, 
product developers framed documentation as a barrier to NPD activity. Quality assurance staff 
did not interpret this as a signal of an overly burdensome enactment of formal regulatory rules 
(as Paper II shows it was) but rather explain the complaint through role attribution. Quality 
assurance staff believed that these complaints were a natural consequence of the product devel-
opment practice (e.g., through expectancies of creativity, disruption, innovation, new ideas, 
etc.) and, by association, with the individuals that engage in product development activities. 
Correspondingly, product developers viewed quality assurance staff as inhibiting development 
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work, through for instance documentation, because quality assurance as a practice is about con-
trol and those working with it like control.  
Meanwhile, both NPD staff and quality assurance staff considered what they do as support-
ive of innovation and contributing to the company’s goals related to the practice of regulatory 
compliance. For example, quality assurance saw regulation as a set of common sense practices 
that ensure safety and help develop better products; product developers were proud to be en-
gaged in work that is aimed to improve the quality of life for patients. Therefore, feedback did 
not have any major effect on altering resource understandings. 
To conclude, between task environment feedback can possibly, but not necessarily, alter 
what actors become mindful of and what they take for granted. 
6.2.2. The sharing of resource alteration proposals as a trigger for feed-
back 
The practice of sharing resource alteration proposals is part of an ongoing effort to maintain or 
find a state of coordinated resource activities. Feedback either maintains the coordinated re-
source activities in place or causes a breakdown. In both cases, feedback also has the possibility 
to alter what actors are mindful of and what they take for granted. 
Zollo and Winter (2002) discuss constructive confrontations as a means by which infor-
mation exchanges take place that can reduce the ambiguity related to action-outcome linkages. 
This dissertation identifies task environment resource related exchanges as the site for possible 
confrontations. These confrontations are, however, not constructive in the sense that they re-
duce ambiguity. These confrontations are cognitive conflicts between task environments that 
know different things and the same things differently. The conflicts are constructive because 
they allow the actors to find a new state of coordinated resource activities that all actors consider 
possible. These conflicts emerge when two task environments who are linked by a resource 
exchange cannot agree on how to alter that resource in a way that alters the exchange. For 
instance, one task environment may argue for acquisition of new resources, another for lever-
aging existing ones. Paper III and Paper IV illustrates one such case. Specifically, Paper III 
shows that managers may be agree in their representations of environmental changes while 
diverging in their representations of internal capabilities to respond to these changes. These 
types of conflicts must be resolved as the firm attempts to alter its resources. By bringing the 
contentious aspects of resource alteration to the fore, this dissertation extends the current liter-
ature’s emphasis on processual analysis and normative models. 
Interestingly, the findings reported in this dissertation reveals that a state of coordinated re-
source activities can exist despite an underlying divergence in mental representations of re-
sources and the resource activities. Paper III identifies equifinality in schema-action outcomes 
as a possible reason why two different, and even contradictory, resource schemas can exist at 
the same time around a shared schemata of action. The findings suggest that a set of coordinated 
resource activities can exist and emerge around divergent mental representations. In fact, it 
suggests that a collective understanding is impossible as both cognitive and processual limita-
tions (cf. Quinn, 1978; Regnér, 2015) prohibit it. Task environments cannot understand some-
thing in the same way even if they coordinate around the same resource activity.  
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Coordinating resource activities is possible even in the presence of various degrees of re-
source schema divergence since actors just need to agree that a certain activity takes place (but 
not why it takes place). During change, as resource alteration proposals are shared, actors can 
realize that the coordinated activity was shared only in action and not in thought. This materi-
alizes as a disagreement around alteration proposals. Since finding a new set of coordinated 
resource activities poses challenges when representations of possible resource related actions 
differ, actors need to engage in framing contests of the kind Kaplan (2008a) describes. But in 
contrast to Kaplan’s emphasis on initial state frame divergences, this dissertation suggests that 
framing contests pool experiences and viewpoints, make them explicit, and allow actors to find 
a new state of coordinated resource activities they can agree on. There is no need for frame 
divergences to be reduced. All that is necessary is to find a state of coordinated resource activ-
ities that actors (from all involved task environments) agree can take place. 
So far, I have only discussed feedback as a result of dynamics. But stable environments 
provide a different type of feedback. The lack of any reaction to a resource alteration is also a 
form of feedback. During times of relative stability, there exists little reason for actors to discuss 
existing coordinated resource activities. This state is however far from static. Feldman (2000; 
2004) establishes that even patterned actions repeated over time are inherently generative and 
dynamic. Paper III suggests that this inherent capacity to alter existing resource uses is directed 
in its impact. This means that it is only alterations that have a cross-functional impact that will 
trigger a response from other functional area practitioners. Those changes in resource uses and 
resource representations limited to a specific functional area will go unnoticed by other func-
tional areas. Over time, actors’ resource representations will change as the task environment 
economizes its activities to lower the cost of its expected deliverables.  
However, since actors in other environments are not necessarily aware of these changes as 
long as no shared resource activity is affected, the conditions for an initial state agreement, i.e., 
the original basis on which that coordinated resource activity was established, will change even 
if the coordinated activity is maintained. Stable environments thus lead to inertia over time as 
resource understandings diverge. 
Additionally, this dissertation confirms that mental representations can differ in magnitude 
of a specific characteristic such as fungibility (Danneels, 2011), but shows also that mental 
representations can differ in their composition. Paper III shows how NPD practitioners repre-
sented their exchange with HRM practitioners as one where the latter supplied all human capital 
needs. This representation was seen as dated by human resource practitioners, who argued that 
decades of increasing focus on incremental short term performances had shaped cross-func-
tional exchanges to supplying human resources capable of incremental development only. 
These divergences could support the existing coordinated activity and remained hidden. They 
surfaced only when resource alteration proposals were shared and in the feedback from other 
task environments. 
If we accept this equifinality in schema-action outcomes, then resource alteration becomes 
a search for congruence in schemata of resource actions. Seen as such, the successful response 
to environmental change involves a search for a new coordinated state of resource activities 
that has a superior rent generating capacity. Similarly, success in stable environments becomes 
 
 
64 
 
a search for specialization that does not disrupt existing agreements of coordinated resource 
activities. Prolonged periods of stability lead to specialization through the firm’s different task 
environments, which makes finding a new set of coordinated activity difficult. This argument 
contrasts those made by for instance Jarzabkowski (2004). She argues that firms are “more 
prone to adaptive practices when they are populated by diverse and heterogeneous communi-
ties” (p. 539). Jarzabkowski identifies micro-communities of activity inside firms as a genera-
tive force of new resource related actions and directs attention to Regnér’s (2003) study of how 
strategy creation processes differ at the periphery of an organization and at its center, and 
Burgelman’s (1983) study of internal venturing. 
However, there exist multiple examples where firms did not succeed in leveraging their in-
ternal heterogeneity in order to alter existing resources when environments change. Kodak is 
one obvious example where existing resources were successfully redeployed into new technical 
capabilities, but where the firm failed to reach a new coordinated resource state that would 
capitalize on these resource alterations. Similarly, environmental changes have been reported 
to cause disagreement within a firm between heterogeneous groups as to what the breakdown 
entails for resource alteration (see for instance Kaplan, 2008b; Zbaracki & Bergen, 2010). To 
reconcile my findings and arguments with those of Jarzabkowski (2004), I propose that sharing 
resource alteration proposals are an important consideration. Specialization may occur with or 
without actors being aware of what others do. Without constant sharing (which is costly) actors 
will diverge and specialize in ways that lead to inertia. 
6.2.3. The creation of resource understandings in moments of practice 
This dissertation shows that resource understandings are created in moments of practice where 
the mindful and the habitual interact. Actors do not carry around mental representations of re-
sources that include all possible characteristics and their uses, but rather use practice to create 
mental representations in situated contexts.  
During strategy work, practitioners assess existing resources (i.e., asset characteristics, en-
acted rules, and coordinated resource activities) in relation to their representations of a desired 
future state. As practitioners engage in resource assessment activities, recollections of the past 
are related to the desired future state and resource schemas are created. Since task environments 
differ between functional areas, the created resource schemas differ too. 
These differences in interpretation and functional area specific reliance on historical prac-
tices is evidenced by the use of strategy tools such as SWOT. For instance, a reported decline 
in the number of suggested ideas to an idea box, was seen by HRM practitioners as indicating 
lowered creativity and thus associated with a weakness, a W in the SWOT. Linking the decline 
to lower creativity was done without much reflection. In contrast, NPD practitioners drew dif-
ferent conclusions based on their specific experiences. It is in those moments, that historic and 
situated non-strategic uses of everyday practices, e.g., the idea suggestion box, becomes strate-
gic for the active assessment of the resource base. Actors create resource related mental repre-
sentations in these moments of practice. Paper IV shows that in using strategy practices like 
SWOT and strategy away days, strategy practitioners rely not on a tabula rasa approach char-
acterized by active thinking—which such an episode is argued to elicit (cf. Louis & Sutton, 
1991; Chia & MacKay, 2007)—but rather draw on everyday practices in an unreflective way 
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during these episodes of active thinking. During resource assessment, practitioners draw on a 
collection of practices. There seems to be less of a ‘switching’ between modes of thinking, and 
rather the simultaneous application of both habitual and mindful thinking. 
These arguments contrast those of Danneels (2011: 27), who argues that managers can ac-
cess understanding of resource characteristics through the practice of resource assessment—
including activities such as “frank debate,” “eliciting brand association,” and “judging the fit 
between dominant associations with possible extensions.” Danneels assumes the existence of 
inherent asset characteristics which assessment can reveal. Paper IV does not share these as-
sumptions. It shows that it is not clear exactly what an accurate resource schema is or what an 
honest self-assessment may reveal to strategy practitioners (aside from task disagreements).  
Resource assessment outcomes are task environment specific. Relatedly, Orlikowski (2000; 
2002) argues that resource properties emerge as a result of practice. The materiality of a re-
sources is not the sole determinant in its value generating potential. Rather, practice determines 
how a resource—in Paper IV human resources and in Orlikowski’s studies technology—is un-
derstood and deployed in value generating ways. Here, practice becomes essential to the very 
nature of a resource. To illustrate how a practice ontology relates to the accuracy of resource 
representations, consider Orlikowski’s findings that service technicians use a software-hard-
ware architecture differently than do consultants in terms of knowledge sharing. Is it possible 
to claim that a certain use corresponds to a more accurate resource schema?  
My own field observations suggest that actors cannot know which resource assessment are 
correct. Instead, they may interpret the created divergences, and the subsequent cognitive con-
flicts, as resistance to change and/or political games. Interestingly, Paper IV reveals that the 
locus of divergent resource understandings may be different than the locus of emerging cogni-
tive conflicts. The former is shaped by the practices closest to actors’ professional roles, the 
latter by coordinated resource activities. This adds to the difficulty of resolving conflicts be-
cause they emerge in places different from their underlying causes. 
Additionally, Paper IV shows that the mindful and the habitual are not opposites character-
izing different instances, but are in fact part of the same instance. This adds to a growing body 
of evidence that the habitual and the mindful are in fact active at once in any given instance (cf. 
Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Practitioners draw on historical 
practices to derive resource related meaning in mindful ways. In other words, they are aware of 
the practices and specific moments of practice they use during their strategy praxis. Practition-
ers are however not aware of the habitual tendencies of their meaning attribution. That is to say, 
they tend to derive meaning from instances of practice in a largely habitual fashion and do not 
reflect much on the conclusions they draw. And as long as strategy work unfolds in a setting 
where participating practitioners represent a homogenous task environment, habitual tendencies 
will remain unchallenged. Resource schemas that emerge during strategy work are thus specific 
to the task environment in which they emerge.  
These arguments have implications for how we understand prior findings. Consider for in-
stance Porac et al.’s (1989) account for events among the Scottish knitwear manufacturers. 
While the authors attribute events to mental models and perceptions of who the competition is, 
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it is very likely that such perceptions are carried by fields of practice. Here, knitwear strategy 
practitioners would mindfully and purposefully consider their competitive environment, but 
reach conclusions influenced by habitual and taken for granted ‘truths’ such as those underlying 
the cognitive taxonomies that Porac et al. (1989) account for. That is to say, concepts in the 
cognitive taxonomies like ‘fashion,’ ‘natural fibers,’ and ‘high quality’ are imbued with mean-
ing in specific contexts and in specific times (cf. Schatzki, 2005), therefore what is brought to 
mindful consideration is often based on the habitual and taken for granted. The mindful allows 
for considerations to be made; the habitual shapes the considerations made. 
The next chapter develops a cyclical theory of resource alteration based on this discussion.
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7. The resource alteration cycle 
In Chapter 2 the literature review resulted in two how-based research questions. The first asks 
how resource understandings shape resource alterations. The second asks how resource altera-
tions shape resource understandings. Chapter 7 builds on the analytical discussion in the previ-
ous chapter and extends existing resource alteration theory by proposing a model of resource 
alteration as a perpetual cycle.  
7.1. Introducing a model of resource alteration 
The model aims to describe the relationship between resource understandings and resource al-
teration by accounting for both cognitive dimensions and practice dimensions. It focuses on 
four relational components: 
(1) the configuration of activities that are mindful and habitual,  
(2) the combination of resource schemas and schemata of resource actions that make up an 
actor’s knowledge of a resource,  
(3) the resource alteration decisions made, and  
(4) the feedback on the choices made in (3) that either maintains a current state of resource 
coordination or cause a breakdown in an existing state of resource coordination.  
The first two, activity configuration and resource knowledge, are primarily cognitive dimen-
sions. The last two, alteration decision and task environment feedback, are primarily practice 
dimensions. The entire process is depicted in Figure 3. Each task environment has its own 
unique resource alteration cycle. 
 
Figure 3. The resource alteration cycle. 
These components and their linkages are kept separate for analytical reasons. In reality, they 
represent different aspects of a relational totality. Each is discussed next. 
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7.2. Activity configuration 
It is clear that the way actors interact with asset characteristics impacts the way these actors 
understand these asset characteristics. However, resource understandings are not linked directly 
to asset characteristics. Rather they are linked to the employment of these asset characteristics 
through activities that actors are either mindful of or that are part of habitual activity. 
Actors are unable to bring into awareness some aspects of reality. This argument resembles 
the concept of cognitive blind-spots, i.e., an inability to perceive certain aspects of the environ-
ment (cf. Porac et al., 1989; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991), but is different. Habitual activities are 
those that an actor performs in a routinized manner, that is part of an internalized practice, or 
any other aspect that an actor takes for granted and relies on for everyday activity. Habitual 
activity is what makes out the non-conscious part of cognition (cf. Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; 
Evans, 2008; Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008) and that is part of patterned activity that is 
repeated over time. Habitual activities are those we know so well that we literally cannot re-
member them. Actors in task environments will habitually perform some of their resource re-
lated activities, i.e., the way they interact with asset characteristics, the way they enact rules, 
and the way they coordinate resource activities with other actors in other task environments. 
In addition to habitual activities, the set of resource related activities involves also those 
activities that an actor is mindful of. These are the activities that an actor actively considers and 
thinks about, to which he or she applies their limited attention. These are the activities that an 
actor can consciously recall as he or she considers asset characteristics and potential resource 
related activities. In contrast, asset characteristics that are part of habitual activities are not ini-
tially available for conscious recall during moments of resource alteration decisions (an obser-
vation that informed the decision availability axiom).  
The idea that there exist two different systems of thought is, as above mentioned, well es-
tablished (Kahneman, 2011). Historically, these two modes are considered to be like “gears” or 
separate parts, where under conditions of stability or ‘business as usual’ actors rely on cognitive 
shortcuts informed by repeated habitual activities. Thinking becomes mindful or active under 
conditions such as novelty, discrepancy between expected and actual outcome, and during spe-
cific requests of active thinking (Louis & Sutton, 1991). The model proposed here contrasts this 
view. It instead joins an emerging recognition that the two are simultaneously shaping thought 
and subsequent action (cf. Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). The model separates the mindful and 
the habitual for analytical reasons. In reality, the habitual and the mindful are inextricably linked 
and make out the cognitive context of activity configurations (cf. Regnér, 2008). 
Furthermore, not all mindful activity is of equal importance. Some mindful activities are 
more important than others in shaping resource understandings. Paper IV, shows how certain 
parts of an activity configuration seem to have some priority in determining the outcome when 
actors create resource related mental representations. This means that activity configurations 
may share a semblance of similarity when we consider only the observable elements, but the 
way they shape understanding is relational. It is this step from activity configurations to re-
source knowledge that is illustrated with the letter a in Figure 3. It is also this assumption of an 
ever present divergence, as opposed to shared mental representations, that distinguishes the 
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model developed here from more recent developments in the cognitive micro-foundations lit-
erature. 
The resulting resource knowledge is considered next. 
7.3. Resource related knowledge 
The configuration of habitual activity and mindful activity underlies an actors resource 
knowledge. There are two types of resource knowledge that are important for the way resource 
alteration unfolds. The first is a practical understanding involving resource related activit ies, 
i.e., schemata of resource activities. The second is the actor’s resource related mental represen-
tations. 
The schemata of resource actions builds on Schatzki’s (2001) concept of shared practical 
understanding, i.e., the aspects of a social context that include all that which is assumed as 
givens by the members of that social context (see also, Bourdieu, 1990: 66–67). It is the social 
accomplishment’s equivalent to script based thinking and is based around non-conscious appli-
cation of practical knowledge that needs no component of active thinking. Schemata of resource 
activities make out the part of practical resource knowledge that is inextricably linked to that 
task environment. Here, knowledge is taken for granted, it is a ‘given’ to the members of that 
task environment. This knowledge includes the asset characteristics underlying a certain utility, 
the reason that certain enacted rules exist and must exist, and what constitutes an existing re-
source related coordination across task environments. 
In contrast to these schemata of resource activities, resource schemas are the mental repre-
sentations of resources that actors are conscious about in developing their resource alteration 
proposals. Danneels (2011) suggest that these schemas related to certain properties of certain 
asset characteristics and how this influences the representation of the potential uses of these 
asset characteristics. This dissertation expands the resource schema concept to include also the 
representations of enacted rule environments and the coordinated resource activities that exists. 
This moves the resource concept away from its increasingly objectified view toward being con-
sidered as a social accomplishment. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there exist ontological issues, both with considering resource 
related knowledge as non-conscious dispositions, and as conscious mental representations. In 
the former, the task environment becomes a carrier of acquired characteristics, and in the latter 
the environment is devoid of meaning as meaning is made of it. The proposed model considers 
schemata of resource activities and resource schemas as two co-existing parts. Here, task envi-
ronments are laden with meaning carried by fields of practice. These practices shape both how 
specific routines evolve, and the mental representations that are created during resource assess-
ment. 
To illustrate the parallel nature of the habitual and the mindful, consider the institutionalized 
strategy practice of an away-day where key decision makers use various strategy tools, such as 
a SWOT, in their making of strategy. One can argue that, and interviewees would probably 
describe, such an instance as representing an episode of active and deliberate thought, where 
resource schemas matter in mindful ways, and where resource related decisions represent the 
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outcome of such mindful moments. There exist an increasing body of literature suggesting that 
such statements are based on our limited awareness of our own consciousness (cf. Evans, 2008; 
Lieberman, 2007; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005). In line with these findings, Chapter 
5 discusses how actors are mindful of the historical and contextual practices they draw on, but 
not of the conclusions they draw. The model aims to capture this duality between the mindful 
mental representations and the habitual schemata of resource actions by including both in an 
actor’s resource knowledge. 
Based on this resource knowledge, actors in a task environment will propose and work to-
ward certain resource alteration options. When actors within a task environment agree upon a 
choice they alter resources toward increased adaptation or specialization. It is this process that 
the letter b indicates in Figure 3. 
7.4. Resource alteration decisions 
The activity configurations and the resource knowledge are here both considered cognitive as-
pects as they relate to dynamics that take place in the mind of an individual. In contrast, altera-
tion decisions relate to observable activity. 
There are numerous ways in which resource alteration choices could be categorized. The 
model uses Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) evolutionary elements of adaptation and speciali-
zation. Adaptation is often described as a composite construct, in part a deliberate aim, in part 
the process of adapting, and in part an outcome (cf. Schindehutte & Morris, 2001). A firm that 
has a high adaptation capacity is able to respond to market changes and has a higher probability 
of finding a new state of coordinated resource activities as compared to firms that are more 
specialized. Thus, adaptive firms are those that display a plasticity in their resource related 
activities within and between their task environments. 
In contrast to adaptation, specialization involves resource dynamics that enhance survivabil-
ity in stable environments. Here, stability refers to the long term exchanges between task envi-
ronments. Alteration decisions that favor specialization are those that enable maximum utility 
within a given set of asset characteristics, enacted rules, and coordinated resource activities. 
Specialization does not directly alter coordinated resource activities, as adaptation often does, 
but is every bit as dynamic as adaptation. Both adaptation and specialization materialize in the 
same kind of observable phenomenon, i.e., work that increases fitness in an environment. The 
difference being that dynamic environments tend to favor generalist traits, e.g., a high level of 
social cognition and transactive memory (cf. Healey et al., 2009). In turn, stable environments 
tend to favor specialist traits, e.g., low cost production of value offerings. To understand this 
argument, consider Darwin’s Galápagos finches. The beaks of the finches are highly specialized 
to specific food sources. Removing a food source would constitute environmental change that 
necessitates adaptation, i.e., being able to eat something else. Simply getting better at eating the 
food source, i.e., wasting less energy, constitutes specialization. 
The resource dynamics that take place within a task environment during specialization are 
troublesome to spot by actors who are not members of this task environment. This is because 
the coordinated resource activity is likely to remain unaltered. Specialization increases resource 
related divergences over time between task environments. This is also why it is highly unlikely 
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that there will ever exist shared mental representations in organizations with distinct task envi-
ronments and why coordination is only enabled by shared understanding of practical activity.11 
The exchanges that happen between an organization’s task environments are different from 
nuts and finches in at least one significant way, task environments can signal shifts to coordi-
nated resource states more quickly than can evolutionary processes. These signals act as feed-
back mechanisms that either maintain or cause breakdowns in existing coordinated resource 
activities between task environments. 
7.5. Feedback between task environments 
Every resource alteration proposal, be it adaptation or specialization, is subject to feedback once 
it affects the coordinated task environment (arrow c). This coordinated task environment is the 
locus of feedback related to resource activities shared between task environments. The model 
considers two extreme types of feedback: feedback that maintains an existing state of coordi-
nated resource activities, and feedback that cause breakdowns in an existing state of coordinated 
resource activities. 
A simple case of task environment feedback relates to the specialization that every task en-
vironment tends toward when the external environment is relatively stable. Actors are here 
evaluated on the basis of how efficiently they can supply an agreed upon deliverable to other 
task environments. Most of the time, this feedback is simply in the form no input and thus 
maintains the coordinated resource activities already in place. Occasionally, the coordinated 
parts get affected by alteration decisions. When this happens, actors give feedback based on 
how they interpret the alteration attempt. If an actor agrees that the alteration attempt is feasible, 
then the alteration option is reinforced. 
Over time in stable environments, actors search for a state of coordinated resource activities 
that: (1) makes sense to all task environments involved (but in all likelihood makes different 
sense), and (2) moves toward the most efficient state possible. And as the cardinality of the set 
of shared resource activities is reduced, the number of possible resource alteration options de-
creases. This reasoning is analogous to a smaller black triangle in Figure 2. Firms in stable 
environments are known to become rigid and to find adaptation difficult. The model presented 
here suggests that one reason for this rigidity is that firms, once specialized, are unlikely to be 
able to find a new state of coordinated resource activities since the intersection between what 
the involved task environments believe is possible is so small. 
The second case of task environment feedback happens in dynamic environments. There 
exists a rich stream of literature on how divergent mental representations and divergent task 
environments matter (or not) for the direction of resource alteration (cf. Kaplan, 2008a; Regnér, 
                                               
11 Healey et al. (2009) argue that shared understanding can exist in the shape of transactive memory—meta-
knowledge of other’s expertise and skills. My findings in Papers II-IV suggests that transactive memory does not 
exist as a shared understanding of expertise and skills. Instead, what exists is a shared understanding that a partic-
ular coordinated activity takes place. Healey et al. rely on perceptual measures where respondents are asked to rate 
how well they believed they knew the expertise of other members and how well a team works together in a coor-
dinated fashion. The issue here is that a respondent would rate a stable coordinated resource activity as high re-
gardless of whether that activity was based on contradictory mental representations or a consensus one. 
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2003; Walsh, 1988; Dougherty, 1992a; Stacey, 1995). The model presented in Figure 3 pro-
poses that dynamic environments are different from stable ones mainly based on how they af-
fect the activity configurations of decision makers. In stable environments, mindful activity 
becomes internalized and habitual as a coordinated resource state is maintained. In dynamic 
environments, it is possible but not necessary, that habitual activities become mindful. I write 
possible but not necessary because there is nothing that prevents two contradictory resource 
schemas and/or schemata of resource activities to allow one and the same activity. Framing 
contests (Kaplan, 2008a) represent one such coordinated social interaction that makes the ha-
bitual visible (although the contest and conflict itself may not reveal the nature of the habitual 
since the locus of conflict, often a coordinated activity, is different than the locus of disagree-
ment, often a core practice or belief). 
Feedback alters activity configurations, which triggers a new cycle. In contrast to extant 
literature, feedback is here not conceptualized as a behavioral property (cf. Stacey, 1995). In-
stead, feedback impacts the activity configurations that shape resource understandings, which 
represent the cognitive context of these activity configurations (cf. Regnér, 2008). In the model, 
feedback (e.g., framing contests, dialectical processes, or simply silence) alters activity config-
urations, which alters resource knowledge and resource alteration proposals, which prompts 
more feedback ad infinitum. 
7.6. Concluding remarks on the dynamics in the model 
The model proposed here portrays resource alteration as a perpetual cycle. It suggests that re-
source use over time both enables new resource alteration options as new resource related 
knowledge is attained, as well as makes certain unfavorable options appear favorable as im-
portant aspects become taken for granted. The model suggests also that resource knowledge is 
in part an experiential understanding of the resource, and in part a mental representation of the 
resource. Based on their resource knowledge, actors then propose and attempt resource altera-
tion choices that they consider among available options. These alteration decisions may or may 
not be considered as possible by other task environments. This feedback alters the activity con-
figuration, and the cycle begins anew. 
The model makes visible the cognitive context of resource dynamics (cf. Regnér, 2008). It 
also includes the surrounding context that shapes the mental representations of cognizing actors. 
Regnér (2008) argues that increased insights into resource dynamics may contribute to our un-
derstanding of activities that create and modify organizational assets. The theoretical model 
proposed here provides one possible way to better understand what takes place as actors within 
and between a firm’s various task environments work with resources. The proposed theoretical 
model helps us better understand what type of resource dynamics exist within a firm (i.e., ad-
aptation and specialization), how and where cognitive conflicts emerge as actors engage in re-
source alteration work (i.e., pluralistic resource understandings create conflicts around coordi-
nated resource activities), and why organizations become more rigid over time in stable envi-
ronments (i.e., specialization drives actors toward viewing a minimum of the same resources). 
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8. Conclusions and implications 
8.1. Conclusions 
The purpose of this dissertation was to extend theory on how resource understandings and re-
source alteration unfold within and between a firm’s different task environments. Based on 
three in-depth field studies, this dissertation shows how people throughout an organization un-
derstand resources as they use them, and use resources based on how they understand them. 
Resource usage and resource understandings are reciprocally linked in an ongoing cycle of re-
source alteration. To view resource usage and resource understandings as cyclical, sheds new 
light on some common aspects of everyday organizational reality. This has implications for 
both scholars and practitioners. 
8.2. Implications for theory 
8.2.1. A response to the emerging criticism in resource focused manage-
ment theory 
Resource focused strategic management theories, specifically the resource based view of the 
firm and the dynamic capabilities perspective, have been criticized for the indeterminate nature 
of its basic concepts, i.e., resources and value (cf. Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010; Priem & Butler, 
2001a, 2001b), and routines and capabilities (Felin & Foss, 2009). There is a real lack of clear 
definitions in both the resource based view and the dynamic capabilities literature and they are 
both prone to all-inclusive tautological definitions without clear distinctions from related con-
cepts (Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Barreto, 2010).  
Conceptualizations of resources, resource understandings, and resource alterations are often 
contradictory in the resource focused management research (cf. Arend & Bromiley, 2009). For 
instance, while Zollo and Winter (2002) conceptualize dynamic capabilities as being histori-
cally stable resulting from acquired characteristics. Rindova & Kotha (2001) conceptualize dy-
namic capabilities as a co-evolutionary enactments of products, services, resources and the 
structures of the organization, how it functions, and the competitive advantage that this emerg-
ing system enables but not necessarily realizes. Part of the challenges facing the resource fo-
cused management theories stems from partial inclusion of intellectual roots. This is true both 
when researchers claim to build on assumptions of economic rationality (Arend & Bromiley, 
2009), as well as for cases where researchers claim to build on Penrose (Foss, 1999). The ana-
lytical framework in Chapter 3 and the theoretical model in Chapter 7 provide two examples of 
how theory can be developed using multiple streams of literature where both the cognitive and 
the experiential is considered. 
As Mahoney (1995) argues, coarse-grained conceptualizations of firms and concepts such 
as resources, resource understandings, and resource alterations are not suitable for guiding man-
agers in their everyday activities. Drawing on both cognitive theory and practice theory, this 
dissertation joins recent calls for elucidating the micro-foundations of purposeful strategy ac-
tivity (Felin & Foss, 2009; Regnér, 2008). It focuses specifically on the cognitive context of 
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activity configurations underlying resource dynamics (Regnér, 2008). By focusing on three re-
source dimensions—i.e., asset characteristics and mental representations thereof, enacted rules 
environments and mental representations thereof, and coordinated resource activities and men-
tal representations thereof—this dissertation develops a tentative theoretical model presenting 
resource alteration as a perpetual cycle where resource understandings and resource alterations 
are reciprocally linked.  
The theoretical model helps us understand dynamic capabilities in a different way. First, it 
suggests that firms do not possess a coarse-grained dynamic capability that allows it to pur-
posefully alter its resources. Instead, this dissertation suggests that task environments are con-
stantly engaged in resource dynamics. The ability to alter resources, or lack thereof, in response 
to environmental change is explained by the likelihood that the various task environments can 
settle on a new coordinated set of resource activities. This settlement has to be reached not by 
reducing divergences in resource understandings between actors, but despite of existing diver-
gences and the divergences that are created as strategy work unfolds. 
The proposed theoretical model helps us understand why settling on a new set of coordinated 
resource activities is particularly difficult. Resources link together task environments within an 
organization and resource alteration choices made by actors in one task environment can di-
rectly impact actors in another task environment. When impact is noticed, the reaction from 
actors in other task environments act as feedback that alters the original task environment and 
leads to revised resource understandings. This perpetual cycle underlies resource dynamics 
within an organization. The argument developed in this dissertation suggests that firms may 
possess ‘within task environment’ dynamic capabilities and ‘between task environment’ dy-
namic capabilities. The first relates to the ability of actors within a given task environment to 
alter resources in ways that change productive outputs. The second relates to the ability of actors 
between several task environments to find and settle on a new set of coordinated resource ac-
tivities. Conceptualizing resource alteration as cyclical and considering dynamic capabilities as 
taking place both within and between task environments, helps us understand, for instance, why 
Kodak failed despite the fact that it initiated the digital revolution and built a coveted after 
patent portfolio. Kodak’s task environments displayed resource dynamics in ways that made it 
difficult for actors to settle on new coordinated resource activities over time. 
8.2.2. Implications for cognitive theory and resources 
Conceptualizing organizations as comprised of multiple task environments—each with its 
unique set of activities—allows us to investigate how specific configurations of activities de-
termine resource schemas and resource alteration choices. 
The literature on resource schemas and resource alteration conceptualizes resources as sep-
arate entities with objectively assessable resource properties (cf. Danneels, 2011). This disser-
tation complements this perspective. The dissertation proposes that resources are part of task 
environments and that actors understand resources based on the activity configurations within 
these task environments. This shifts focus away from resource schema accuracies to the partic-
ular activity configurations that shape resource understandings.  
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Danneels (2011) argues that resource schema inaccuracies can lead to resource alteration 
choices that are detrimental for the firm’s long term survival. In his view, resource schemas 
determine the direction of renewal efforts and performance outcomes depend on whether that 
particular resource commitment is competitive or not. In contrast, this dissertation argues that 
resource understandings are far more dynamic. A new strategy represents a commitment to be 
resourced, and during that process practitioners with divergent resource schemas search for a 
congruence in resource related activities. Organizations conceptualized as sets of task environ-
ments is one way to investigate resource related activities, both those activities that are unique 
to meaningfully selected sets of actors and those activities that are shared. 
8.2.3. Implications for practice theory and resources 
There have been calls for investigations into how resource alteration unfolds within firms (cf. 
Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Regnér, 2015). The resource alteration cycle model developed in Chap-
ter 7 is a response that extends resource alteration theory. This cycle—moving continuously 
from activity configurations containing the cognitive context of actors (cf. Regnér, 2008), 
through resource knowledge, through alteration decision, to task environment feedback—is id-
iosyncratic to each meaningfully selected task environment. Here, resource alteration is con-
ceptualized as the search for congruence in resource activities within and between task envi-
ronments as opposed to a search for congruence in thought. 
However, finding a new state of coordinated resource activities is costly and actors are nei-
ther aware of the range of possible resource states nor their fitness (cf. Helfat et al., 2007). This 
reduces the potential of realizing the value of any optimal solution. Also, the inherent dynamics 
of the external environment and the organization itself means that an optimum point would 
always be moving; moves that may necessitate quite radical adjustments for a firm. To what 
extent firms should engage in a search for congruence in resource activities is therefore open to 
question. In some cases, thinking outside the confines of existing task environments may not 
only be extremely difficult, but also so costly that searching for a new state is simply not feasi-
ble. Identifying these cost determinants is a subject for future research. 
8.2.4. Implications for fine-grained studies 
This dissertation offers an alternative to research focused on shared resource schemas. Efforts 
to reach states such as ‘common understanding,’ ‘accurate understandings,’ ‘meaning align-
ment,’ ‘shared beliefs,’ and ‘schema congruence’ is problematic because it promotes the idea 
of such states as both attainable and desirable. The appended papers and this extended sum-
mary suggests that these aligned states are theoretically implausible. There exists no accurate 
understanding. Rather, practitioners within firms understand resources as they use them, and 
use resources as they understand them. 
Also, knowing that schema divergence may cause problems is of little practical use when 
such divergences are not readily apparent to practitioners. It is necessary to equip managers 
with the means to surface incongruent divergences. And even then, it is not feasible to surface 
all incongruences, only meaningful ones. Meaningful ones are those that lead to extended peri-
ods of cognitive conflicts and an inability for task environments to become coordinated around 
resource activities. Paper IV illustrates how meaningful incongruences can be identified and 
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mapped using connectivity mapping which: (a) connects beliefs to activities, and (b) surfaces 
internalized practices prior to resource alteration decisions. However, there remains much to do 
in order to develop connectivity mapping as a tool within management research, and to validate 
it in practice. Hodgkinson’s 2012 keynote speech at the frontiers in managerial and organiza-
tional cognition conference is a call for further attention to these matters. As is the recent call 
for developing methods at the intersection between strategy as practice and cognition that ac-
tively considers the unconscious (cf. Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007).  
The model proposed in Chapter 7 also suggests that prolonged periods of relative stability 
decrease the likelihood of successful resource alteration outcomes due to how activity config-
urations affect resource schemas. This is because stability reduces the overlap between what 
task environments—connected by coordinated resource activities—consider as possible re-
source alterations. Consequently, organizations may be able to alter task environment specific 
capabilities, yet fail in leveraging them when environmental changes necessitate an alteration 
in coordinated resource activities that link together multiple task environments. 
Finally, this dissertation extends the practice literature through an investigation into the ha-
bitual and mindful aspects of practice. The cognitive context of strategizing represents the big-
gest opportunity for future research (cf. Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007; Regnér, 2008). For in-
stance, researchers could investigate and identify the types of activities that determine the mean-
ing carried in fields of practice. This would entail identifying more types of mindful activities 
that principally carry beliefs and meaning. It is also important to identify the moments of prac-
tice that actively repel certain meanings, consequently creating ‘blind spots’ for what infor-
mation the organization collects, or organization-wide inabilities to adapt to certain types of 
changes. Set theoretic methods are particularly suitable for informing such investigations. Set 
theory has the potential of extending this dissertation’s focus to map out the task environments 
throughout an organization and identify sources of predispositions and the potential for emerg-
ing conflicts. 
Here, it is important also to go beyond cold cognition and consider the affective aspects of 
resource related decision making. Especially since actors often (mis)interpret resource related 
decisions as having to do with power and politics; topics which are emotionally charged. We 
know that emotions shape conscious thought in often non-conscious ways. Recent develop-
ments in neuroeconomics offer intriguing insights that may help us understand the dynamics 
inherent in fields of practice. As Whittington (2006) notes, strategy practitioners are not passive 
recipients of practice but actively engage in improvised performances. Dual-process theory and 
neuroeconomics may help us understand the nature and cause of these improvisations. 
8.3. Implications for practicing managers 
The three managerial implications offered here are developed with the following criteria in 
mind: they need to be grounded in the fine-grained reality of everyday interaction, they need to 
focus on the importance of practitioners’ actions in producing organizational outcomes, and 
they need to be aimed to enable changes or reinforcement of practice pertaining to certain out-
comes. Three managerial implications are offered here, related to: (1) the role of practice in 
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resource assessment, (2) cognitive conflicts and emerging framing contests, and (3) the use of 
strategy tools. These are explored next. 
8.3.1. Resource assessment 
When environments change and there is a need to respond, managers often ask two questions: 
(1) “What are our resources?”, and (2) “How can we use them?” There exist multiple manage-
rial tools and advice in the literature on this subject. I contend, however, that the efforts inspired 
by these tools and the literature may be unfruitful, and even damaging to a firm, since they can 
create situations where the actors in a firm finds themselves unable to carry on strategy work.  
The reason for such stalemates is the assumption of objective resources that underpins many of 
these tools and the mainstream literature. Showing that resources are not objective and that 
there are multiple task environment specific understandings of resources is one of this disserta-
tion’s main managerial contributions. 
The proposed view of resources as context-specific, may seem at odds with how resources 
are normally conceptualized, and to an extent may even appear counterintuitive to readers. 
Surely, the various machines, tangible assets, raw materials and other capital resources availa-
ble to firms must exist. The quick response to any such criticism is: “Yes, but it exists differently 
to different people—who do different things—and at different times.”  
The long answer to whether or not resources exist independently of the practices specific to 
a task environment depends on the specific resource type. Certain resource types are more or 
less obvious. Culture as a resource is admittedly fuzzier and ill-definable than is uranium. But 
even what we consider clearly defined resources today are in many ways a result of our tech-
nological advancements. Uranium was not an energy resource until the physicist Enrico Fermi 
discovered the potential of nuclear fission in 1934. And flint is no longer a contested raw ma-
terial for toolmaking. Admittedly, certain resources have more objective properties than others, 
but the objective properties we are aware of seems to change over time. Our understanding of 
resources has developed over time following scientific advancements. We have discovered 
some properties that we consider objective today, e.g., that Uranium and Radium are radioac-
tive. Correspondingly, our regulatory rules have changed (e.g., in the early 1900s, regulations 
required that health drinks contain radioactivity if labeled as such). 
Treating resources as subjective and in part related to how we as humans coordinate activity 
and make up rules as we learn about the various properties of the resources we use has another 
major managerial implication. Managers are urged not to consider the practice of resource as-
sessment as a means by which some objective truth can be uncovered. The practice of resource 
assessment involves a series of activities through which members of various task environments 
form an understanding of the asset being assessed. And since different practitioners throughout 
an organization experience a particular resource in their own unique ways, it is unlikely that 
practitioners from different task environments will ever understand a resource in the same way. 
For instance, a human resource manager who views innovation as the outcome of individual 
level creativity and incentives, will interpret product developers as a resource differently than 
will an R&D manager who views innovation as the outcome of a process. 
 
 
78 
 
Practitioners need to focus on the shared practical understanding of a particular resource. 
That is to say, the possibility of reaching a common agreement of what resource related activi-
ties are possible. Sharing the beliefs and assumptions underlying such practical understandings 
are not necessary in order for various task environments (e.g., functional areas, professional 
workgroups, and/or hierarchy levels) to work. In fact, many coordinated resource activities un-
fold in settings where practitioners have contesting and contradictory beliefs of why these ac-
tivities take place. These divergences are necessary for an organization to function, but it may 
also severely hinder successful resource alteration outcomes. Recognizing that resource under-
standings are pluralistic throughout an organization can help managers avoid unproductive af-
fective conflicts, i.e., emotional conflicts, which often emerge following cognitive conflicts, 
i.e., task disagreements in ways developed next. 
8.3.2. Cognitive conflicts and framing contests 
Cognitive conflicts are task related conflicts based around divergent perspectives. Framing con-
tests are the practices by which such cognitive conflicts are settled. These conflicts are not to 
be confused with affective conflicts which relate to interpersonal relationships. Cognitive con-
flicts are strictly limited to task disagreements (cf. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Floyd & Lane, 2000). 
In many ways, cognitive conflicts are good as they represent multiple viewpoints around a par-
ticular task which may improve the final solution. However, cognitive conflicts are often mis-
interpreted as affective conflicts. When that happens, task disputes become personal disputes. 
Another misinterpretation that may occur is that of a task disagreement becoming interpreted 
as a political struggle. Task disagreements around resources are particularly likely to be inter-
preted as political games given how politicking is often associated with a control over resources. 
While politics may involve contests about resource interpretations, this dissertation’s findings 
suggest that such conflicts are often task related in nature. People do not engage in such con-
flicts because they know that a certain interpretation will give them more power, they do so 
because they honestly believe that a certain interpretation is the correct one. Oftentimes, they 
are not even aware of how others perceive the same resource. 
To this background, managers should be more open to interpreting resistance and politicking 
in the light of divergent resource understandings. This may open up for a more constructive 
dialogue where cognitive conflicts can contribute to reaching better solutions. Note also that a 
realization of divergence in resource understandings may be asymmetrically distributed 
throughout an organization. That is to say, certain members will be more or less aware of dif-
ferences in how resources are interpreted. This is an important consideration. The framework 
developed in Chapter 7 may help managers realize and uncover these differences. 
The particular context in which an individual and the resources are embedded also affect 
both the awareness of divergence, and the specific ways resources are understood. It is likely 
that untraditional career ladders (where a practitioner has experienced multiple professional 
communities and organizational contexts) are signs of individual capabilities that facilitate a 
move toward cognitive conflicts. It can help actors with avoiding role attribution when consid-
ering the input from other functional areas. Role attribution refers to misinterpreting what other 
people say based on what their professional roles. For instance, when product developers com-
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plain about documentation, it is easy for other actors to view product developers as being un-
controllably creative and therefore likely to dislike administration. The dangers of attributing 
behavior to roles is that it limits cognitive conflicts and honest discussions centered on problems 
and solutions to those problems. Practitioners need to take these aspects into consideration when 
judging the actions of others. Failure to do so can easily turn a situation into the finger pointing 
and blame games that many of us have experienced. 
Alternatively, managers can implore their organizational actors to disregard cognitive con-
flicts where possible, and allow coordination and resource understandings to form through re-
source alteration feedback rather than attempting to frontload that understanding (which may 
be both a costly and highly uncertain undertaking). This mode of operating gives credence to 
management methodologies that promote a culture among task environments where conflicts 
are accepted as an inevitability. 
8.3.3. The use of strategy tools 
The third and final advice offered to practitioners is to actively consider how the past is used 
during strategy episodes such as strategy away days and workshops. Commonly used strategy 
tools such as SWOT, PEST, segmentation, brainstorming, etc., may make it difficult to question 
assumptions that are taken for granted. 
The specific way these tools are used often involves focusing ongoing debate around a par-
ticular topic of relevance. But when people consider resources, they commonly rely on unques-
tioned interpretations of past resource related activities. What may seem as a mindful exercise, 
may merely be a mindful rearrangement of taken for granted ‘facts.’ To get around this issue, 
managers are encouraged to include representatives from the task environments with whom 
they coordinate resource activities. This helps stimulate cognitive conflict. 
Another possibility is to introduce connectivity mapping as a strategy tool during such strat-
egy episodes. Connectivity mapping is particularly suitable for mapping what practices are used 
to form certain beliefs. It surfaces taken for granted assumptions and it allows for reflection 
around these assumptions which is beneficial for cognitive conflicts. Connectivity mapping as 
a method is described in the appended Paper IV. 
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